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ABSTRACT
Contemporary separation-of-powers theory and practice generally
rely on two competing theories—formalism and functionalism—to
frame and decide contested questions about the scope of each
branch’s constitutional power and authority. In some areas, this
dichotomy works reasonably well and possesses significant
explanatory force. But the dichotomy’s utility is considerably less
obvious in the context of the federal appointments process.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in National Labor Relations
Board v. Noel Canning crisply demonstrates the limitations of
formalism and functionalism in resolving separation-of-powers
questions that equally implicate text, structure, and historical practice.
Moreover, Justice Breyer’s Noel Canning opinion deftly transcends
the formalism–functionalism dichotomy even while relying on textual,
structural, historical, and practical arguments drawn from both modes
of separation-of-powers analysis. Noel Canning teaches that
constitutional text, by itself, will not always yield clear or reliable
answers to difficult separation-of-powers questions. The decision also
highlights a serious shortcoming in formalist legal analysis: When the
Constitution expressly vests conflicting powers in different branches—
as in the context of staffing the executive branch—purely formalist
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analysis will not suffice. Simply put, the Framers not only separated
powers; they also blended them. In many important areas, the
constitutional text does not clearly specify where one branch’s
authority ends and another’s begins.
A workable account of the federal appointments process requires
careful consideration of structure and practice, of original intent and
appointments conventions developed over time, and of the conflicting
textual imperatives of the Senate’s advice-and-consent power and of
the unitary executive (understood in light of the President’s Article II
“take care” duty). In order to develop an effective separation-ofpowers jurisprudence, the federal courts must transcend the
formalism–functionalism dichotomy in this important area of
separation-of-powers theory and practice. More broadly, the
shortcomings of the formalism–functionalism dichotomy in the
context of appointments suggest the need to rethink the dichotomy
more broadly as well.
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INTRODUCTION
Few areas of separation-of-powers theory and practice present
more analytical complexities than does the federal appointments
process. Myriad reasons exist for this state of affairs, and it is
relatively easy to sketch why this area of administrative law does not
seem susceptible of an easy or linear analysis. Conflicting textual
commands, variable historical practices, and larger policy
considerations involving the legitimate prerogatives of both the
President and the Senate make applying separation-of-powers
doctrine to the federal appointments process a particularly difficult
1
exercise.
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in National Labor
2
Relations Board v. Noel Canning confirms that the federal
appointments process resists any easy or obvious separation-ofpowers analysis. Although, strictly speaking, Noel Canning involves
only the recess-appointments power rather than the appointments
3
4
process more generally, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion offers a
1. For a thoughtful and comprehensive discussion of the potential importance of relying
on consistent historical practice over time to inform separation-of-powers analysis, see generally
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012).
2. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
3. See id. at 2556–57, 2576–77.
4. Nominally, Noel Canning was a unanimous decision: all nine members of the Supreme
Court voted to uphold the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s holding that President
Obama could not use the recess-appointments power to make the contested appointments to
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). See id. at 2556–57 (opining that the Senate was in
session at the time of the contested recess appointments, and holding that “the President lacked
the power to make the recess appointments here at issue”); id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(rejecting Justice Breyer’s reasoning in support of the outcome because it “transforms the
recess-appointment power from a tool carefully designed to fill a narrow and specific need into
a weapon to be wielded by future Presidents against future Senates,” and explaining that he,
along with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, “concur[red] in the judgment
only”). Justice Scalia read the Recess Appointments Clause far more narrowly than the
majority; he would permit its use only to make intersession appointments for offices that
became vacant while the Senate was in an intersession recess. See id. at 2592–93. Accordingly,
Noel Canning actually reflects a narrow 5–4 division of the Justices on the substantive issues
before the Court. Because Justice Scalia rejected virtually all of Justice Breyer’s specific
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novel “third way” of navigating separation-of-powers questions when
conflicting specific constitutional mandates make it impossible to
advance one constitutional imperative without, at the same time,
5
doing violence to another. The opinion relies on a pragmatic
formalist methodology, and thus gives significant attention to the
Constitution’s text, but it also relies on practice, history, and purpose
to ascertain the scope and meaning of the Recess Appointments
6
Clause.
Noel Canning provides an important window into the salience
and viability of formalism and functionalism as analytical tools in the
specific context of the appointments process. Consideration of Noel
Canning will also demonstrate the shortcomings of formalism and
7
functionalism more generally.
This Article explores the failure of traditional formalism and
8
functionalism in the specific context of the federal appointments
process. It argues that sensible results—results that give meaning and
effect to all the structural and substantive provisions of the
Constitution—can be achieved only if reviewing courts blend
concerns and methodologies associated with both schools of thought.
This is so because, in the context of appointments, the Constitution
creates competing—and potentially conflicting—mandates. It

reasoning in support of the Court’s ultimate conclusion, and because he and the other
“concurring” members of the Court would impose significantly more-stringent limits on the
President’s use of the recess-appointments power going forward, in this Article I will refer to
Justice Breyer’s opinion as the “majority” opinion and to Justice Scalia’s nominally concurring
opinion as the “dissent” or “dissenting opinion.”
5. See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1939, 1944–48 (2011). Professor Manning persuasively argues that reviewing courts should
consider the Constitution’s level of generality when applying separation-of-powers doctrine.
“Where the Constitution is specific,” he argues, “the Court should not permit Congress to adopt
a contrary approach under the more general authority it possesses under the Necessary and
Proper Clause.” Id. at 1947–48. On the other hand, “where no specific clause speaks directly to
the question at issue, interpreters must respect the document’s indeterminacy.” Id. at 1948; see
infra notes 158–60 and accompanying text. But cf. Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and
the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 853, 857–58 (1990) (arguing that the nonspecific
Vesting Clauses effect “a complete division of otherwise unallocated federal governmental
authority” and that “[a]ny exercise of governmental power” must fall within the formal
categories of legislative, executive, and judicial duties).
6. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2578 (observing that “as in all cases, we interpret the
Constitution in light of its text, purposes, and ‘our whole experience’ as a Nation”); see also
infra notes 82–117 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 148–85 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of formalism and functionalism and the importance of this dichotomy
to separation-of-powers jurisprudence, see infra notes 52–65 and accompanying text.
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requires Senate confirmation for the President’s appointees to
9
principal offices within the executive branch, but it also requires the
President to ensure the implementation and execution of federal
10
law. In these circumstances, formalist textualism will not provide
plausible answers because the Constitution’s text points in different
11
directions.
The Framers embraced a system of checks and balances as much,
if not more, than a system of strictly separated powers. Moreover, the
Framers designed a system for federal appointments that presents a
serious risk of failure during periods when one party controls the
12
Senate and a different party controls the White House. In this
specific context, the Framers did not separate powers, but instead
13
blended them. Nor is this unique to appointments; in multiple
instances, the Framers allocated a power or responsibility to one
branch that overlaps—or even conflicts—with powers and
14
responsibilities vested in another.
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
11. See infra notes 145–65 and accompanying text.
12. See Manning, supra note 5, at 1983 (observing that “Article II carefully divides the
traditionally executive power of appointment between the President and Congress”). One could
posit, of course, that the Framers did not anticipate the emergence of political parties and
partisan contests for Senate seats and the presidency. See generally Joshua D. Hawley, The
Transformative Twelfth Amendment, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501 (2014) (arguing that the
Electoral College and the method of selecting the President and Vice President in the original
Constitution presumed that these would be nonpartisan offices). Even so, if a serious
disagreement regarding policy arose between the President and a majority of the Senate, the
Framers must have recognized that the Senate would hold the trump card—even if they
anticipated that the Senate would vote on all presidential nominees, they surely also anticipated
that some nominees might fail to receive the Senate’s approval. Thus, it is telling that the
Framers did not provide the President with any alternative means of staffing principal offices
within the executive branch.
13. This blending of powers seeks to achieve a “balance” rather than a “separation” of
powers and functions; it reflects and incorporates the British constitutional tradition, which
generally eschews separating powers in favor of balancing them. See Michael Skold, Note, The
Reform Act’s Supreme Court: A Missed Opportunity for Judicial Review in the United
Kingdom?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 2149, 2154 (2007); see also A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 3, 21–23, 88–89 (1885) (discussing the centrality of
the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy and its relationship to the concept of a balance, rather
than a separation, of powers).
14. The war powers offer an instructive example. Article II provides that “[t]he President
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 1. Article I, however, states that Congress holds the power “[t]o declare War, grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water” and
to create and regulate the armed forces of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–14.
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Moreover, the Framers used this technique to create contested
zones of authority between the President and Congress without
offering any textual guidance on how to resolve the inevitable
15
conflicts that would arise from these overlapping powers. Indeed,
strictly speaking, the Constitution does not even address the issue of
who will resolve these questions in the event of an impasse between
16
the President and Congress. A workable approach to enforcing the

In this context, as with appointments, the Framers intentionally blended, rather than separated,
the war powers. The Constitution simply does not provide a clear answer as to when the
Commander-in-Chief’s power ends and Congress’s authority over declaring war and
establishing the armed forces of the United States begins. For an instructive discussion, see
LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 249–
72 (2007). Accordingly, the constitutional boundaries of these powers remain highly contested.
See, e.g., The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012). The relevant legal
scholarship also reflects the deep-seated nature of this dispute; some legal scholars argue that
congressional authorization must be obtained before the President undertakes action that
otherwise constitutes an act of war, whereas others argue with equal fervor that the President
enjoys substantial authority to undertake military action without first seeking and obtaining
permission from Congress. Compare JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3–5, 8–10 (1993) (advancing the
congressionalist position, which posits Congress must authorize all offensive military
operations), with JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 5–11, 99–100 (2005) (advancing the presidentialist position,
which posits that the President has inherent authority as Commander-in-Chief to initiate
offensive military operations). Thus, in most cases presenting war-powers questions, a federal
judge cannot rely solely on the Constitution’s text, but must instead integrate text, history,
practice, and conventions in order to fashion a persuasive opinion. In other words, only a
blended approach will yield useful answers. See Manning, supra note 5, at 1972 (“New thinking
about the legitimacy of strongly purposive reasoning reveals difficulties with the approach that
underlies both strands of modern separation of powers doctrine.”); see also M. Elizabeth Magill,
The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1138 (2000) (observing,
in the context of separation-of-powers doctrine more generally, that “neither of the dominant
approaches provides a consistent account of the methodology applied or the outcome of the
cases”).
15. DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, THE ORIGINAL COMPROMISE: WHAT THE
CONSTITUTION’S FRAMERS WERE REALLY THINKING 233–36 (2013).
16. Of course, the obvious answer is that the federal courts must resolve such disputes; this
approach also clearly comports with the intention of the Framers. In Federalist No. 78,
Alexander Hamilton writes that “where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands
in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be
governed by the latter rather than the former.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 468 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Thus, “whenever a particular statute contravenes the
Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the
former.” Id. Given that the proponents of the Constitution clearly stated before ratification that
the federal courts would enjoy the power of judicial review, it seems obvious that the federal
judiciary must shoulder the unhappy task of serving as a referee in disputes between the
President and Congress regarding the metes and bounds of their respective powers. See
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996, 1001 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that “the
Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President
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separation-of-powers doctrine must address the problems associated
with blended, rather than separated, powers and responsibilities; Noel
Canning could provide a sound roadmap to achieving this goal.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I sketches how the
Constitution’s text creates conflicting spheres of authority. It
considers whether the federal courts are best positioned to resolve
these conflicts; arguably conflicts of this sort might best be
characterized as “political questions” and left to the President and
17
Congress to sort out on their own. This Part also discusses and
critiques the two dominant approaches to framing and enforcing
18
separation-of-powers doctrine—formalism and functionalism.
Part II provides an overview of the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Noel Canning, with particular attention paid to the
differences in interpretative methodology reflected in Justice Breyer’s
majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s nominally concurring opinion.
Part III then considers the failings of formalism in the context of
disputes arising between the President and Congress in areas where
the Constitution provides potentially conflicting textual mandates (as
is the case with respect to the federal appointments process); it also
examines the failings of functionalism where the Constitution’s text
19
provides clear rules of the road. Parts II and III posit that an
effective approach to framing the appointments process requires
careful attention to both the Senate’s constitutional role in the
appointments process and to the Framers’ conscious decision to
create a unitary executive headed by a single national officer, the
20
President.
and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse,” but also positing that
“[t]he specter of the Federal Government brought to a halt because of the mutual intransigence
of the President and Congress would require this Court to provide a resolution” after the
political branches reach an impasse).
17. See Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–6, 17–19
(2013) (arguing that the federal courts should not resolve disputes between Congress and the
President involving the President’s power to remove principal and inferior officers serving in the
executive branch); see also Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996–1001 (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing
the circumstances in which the federal courts should abstain from deciding disputes between the
President and Congress and the circumstances in which the federal courts have a duty to serve
as a referee between the political branches).
18. See infra notes 52–65 and accompanying text.
19. Manning, supra note 5, at 1950–62 (discussing and describing formalism and
functionalism, but suggesting that a textual approach that considers the specificity or generality
of constitutional text would greatly improve the resolution of separation-of-powers questions).
20. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 596–97 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, The Place of
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Part IV argues that the federal courts should use historical
practice as a means of resolving otherwise irreconcilable
constitutional assignments of responsibility. To be clear, I do not
claim that historical practice, as a normative matter, constitutes the
only, or even the best, potential tiebreaker. But when the
Constitution itself does not provide clear answers to difficult
separation-of-powers questions or, worse still, yields conflicting rules,
a principled decision rooted in historical practice, convention, and
21
policy presents the best way forward.
To the extent that judicial legitimacy rests on both the
perception and underlying reality that federal judges make decisions
based on rules derived from the Constitution itself, as opposed to
22
their personal policy preferences, using historical practice to resolve
separation-of-powers questions in areas where the Framers blended,
rather than separated, constitutional responsibilities makes a great
deal of sense. Accordingly, in the absence of a clear textual mandate
23
that disallows a constitutional convention, the federal courts should
rely on these conventions when engaging in separation-of-powers
analysis; moreover, adoption of historical practice as a tiebreaker in
cases involving conflicting responsibilities should be deployed not

Agencies in Government] (arguing that the Constitution’s structural design clearly anticipates
that the President will enjoy responsibility for the implementation of federal law, including
major administrative programs, and positing that “[w]hatever arrangements are made, one must
be able to characterize the President as the unitary, politically accountable head of all lawadministration, sufficiently potent in his own relationships with those who actually perform it to
serve as an effective counter to a feared Congress”); see also Peter L. Strauss, Foreword:
Overseer, or the “Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696,
696 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer] (“All will agree that the Constitution creates a unitary
chief executive officer, the President, at the head of the government Congress defines to do the
work its statutes detail.”).
21. See Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163,
1165–68, 1181–88 (2013).
22. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 32 (1962). Of course, it bears noting that Professor Bickel once
observed that “[t]he Court exists in the Lincolnian tension between principle and expediency.”
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REV. 40, 50 (1961).
23. The legislative veto provides an example of a circumstance in which the Constitution’s
text provided a clear rule and no conflicting substantive or structural rule existed. See INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–59 (1983); see also Manning, supra note 5, at 1955–58 (discussing
Chadha and rejecting Justice White’s functionalist analysis as failing to give sufficient weight to
the express textual commands of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 with respect to the enactment of
a bill into law). In such cases, the federal courts should not resort to past practice to validate an
otherwise ultra vires action. See infra notes 209–31 and accompanying text.
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only in cases involving the federal appointments process, but more
generally as well.
I. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS POWER
This Part begins by examining in some detail the Constitution’s
text regarding the federal appointments process. It then considers
how the federal courts should go about resolving the constitutional
conflicts that are inherent in the text of the Constitution itself. In
circumstances in which the Framers created potentially conflicting
textual commands, reviewing courts must embrace second-best
solutions—solutions premised on extratextual means of analysis.
More specifically, a reviewing court should place significant reliance
on constitutional conventions and practice over time in order to
resolve such constitutional conflicts.
A. The Constitutional Text and Federal Appointments
The Framers intentionally designed the federal appointments
process as a shared power held jointly by the President and the
24
Senate. Although the President alone enjoys the sole power to
nominate principal and inferior executive officers, as well as Article
25
III judges, the Framers conditioned this power of appointment on
the Senate’s giving its advice and consent to the President’s
26
nominations. Moreover, the Senate’s constitutional power of advice
and consent does not force the Senate to vote on all presidential
nominations subject to the Appointments Clause—or even to

24. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Jonathan Turley, Recess Appointments in the
Age of Regulation, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1523, 1533–37 (2013) (discussing in some detail the debates
surrounding appointments at the Federal Convention and the Framers’ decision to vest
appointments on a shared basis between the President and the Senate). Professor Jonathan
Turley persuasively argues that the “apportionment between the executive and legislative
branches was the dominant feature of the Framer’s [sic] design: the shared power that would
encourage compromise and coordination between the branches.” Id. at 1532–33.
25. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
26. Jonathan Turley, Constitutional Adverse Possession: Recess Appointments and the Role
of Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 965, 973 (describing the
Framers’ decision to vest appointments jointly in the President and the Senate, and arguing that
this process provides “a critical check and balance provision that the two branches must agree
on who should sit on federal courts and in federal offices”).
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27

consider them on the merits. Thus, the Framers blended
responsibility for federal appointments, but failed to specify what
would happen if the political branches became polarized, such that
the Senate simply refused to consider the President’s nominations on
a timely basis.
Accordingly, the federal appointments process provides a posterchild example of the problem of blended, rather than clearly
separated, powers. The Constitution explicitly vests the Senate with a
veto power over presidential appointments to senior executive28
branch posts and Article III federal judgeships; at the same time,
however, the Constitution also requires the President to ensure the
29
enforcement of federal laws. When the Senate refuses to confirm
presidential nominees, invoking its power under the Appointments
Clause, its action substantially burdens the President’s ability to
30
discharge his responsibilities arising under the Take Care Clause.
31
The Opinions Clause and the structural decision to create a unitary

27. Other provisions of the Constitution, however, include time deadlines for action with
default rules that apply after a specified time for action has expired. See infra notes 34–39 and
accompanying text (discussing the so-called “pocket veto” provision of the Constitution).
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
29. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that the President “shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (providing that the federal executive power
“shall be vested in a President of the United States of America”); see also Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, The New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers
Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government
Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1625–29, 1640–45 (2012) (discussing the
Constitution’s deliberate creation of a unitary executive and the consequences that must follow
from this design regarding the President’s ability to oversee and control the enforcement of
federal law).
30. See John C. Roberts, The Struggle over Executive Appointments, 2014 UTAH L. REV.
725, 727 (arguing “that the long-term struggle between the President and the Senate over
executive appointments has now reached a crisis and that we may be approaching a point where
the President’s crucial duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed is significantly
impaired”); id. at 750 (proposing that “specific steps . . . be taken to restore the proper balance
between the President’s prerogative to staff his administration and take care that the laws are
faithfully executed and the Senate’s rightful advice and consent role”).
31. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that the President “may require the
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any
Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices”). It would be nonsensical to grant the
President the right to demand opinions in writing from nonexistent subordinate officers.
Although this fact does not mean that the Senate has a duty to vote on presidential
nominations, it suggests that the Framers believed that Congress would create subordinate
executive offices and that the Senate would agree to give its consent to presidential appointees
to staff them.
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32

executive headed by the President also demonstrate that the
Constitution incorporates a strong assumption that the President will
enjoy the assistance of loyal and reasonably responsive subordinate
33
officers within the executive branch.
The Framers obviously understood that inaction could lead to
gridlock. In other contexts, however, the Constitution contains
provisions that include default rules meant to check inaction by one
branch at the expense of another. The “pocket veto” provision of
34
Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, provides an illustrative example. The
President could, in theory, exercise a de facto veto by neither signing
nor vetoing a particular bill—in the absence of a default rule, the
President could simply toss the bill in a desk drawer and embark on
an extended period of rumination about its merits and shortcomings.
The Framers, however, anticipated this problem and provided a
default rule that forces presidential action: if the President fails to
35
sign or veto a bill within ten days—“Sundays excepted” —it will
36
become a law without his signature. But if Congress has adjourned,
37
making it impossible to return a vetoed bill, “it shall not be a Law.”

32. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 16, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that
“[t]hose politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their
principles and for the justice of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive,” and
observing that “[t]hey have with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary
qualification (of the former) and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single
hand”); see also Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government, supra note 20, at 596–97, 649–50,
660–64, 668–69 (arguing that the Constitution’s text and structure create a unitary executive and
also mandate sufficient presidential control to ensure that that President is meaningfully
accountable for all actions of the executive branch).
33. See Manning, supra note 5, at 2036 (“Since well-settled rules of implication suggest that
the imposition of a duty implicitly connotes a grant of power minimally sufficient to see that
duty fulfilled, the Take Care Clause seems straightforwardly to call for the recognition of
sufficient ‘executive power’ to allow the President to remove subordinates who, in his or her
view, are not faithfully implementing governing law.”).
34. One good way to ascertain constitutional meaning is to read various clauses in tandem,
rather than in isolation; this “intratexualist” approach helps to resolve ambiguities by
considering them in light of how the Framers approached similar problems in other contexts.
See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 747–49 (1999).
35. See Jaynie Randall, Sundays Excepted, 59 ALA. L. REV. 507, 512 (2008) (discussing the
Framers’ careful calibration of the President’s temporal window for considering bills that passed
both houses of Congress).
36. Jaynie Randall explains that “the ten-day period reflects the Framer’s [sic] conception
of a deliberative President, one who relied on advisors and collaborated with Congress in
wielding his negative.” Id. at 510. The ten-day period, Sundays excepted, exceeded the period
provided in contemporary state constitutions that vested the governor with a veto power. See id.
at 510 n.16.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
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Thus, Article I, Section 7, prevents the President from exercising a de
38
facto veto through interminable delay. The Appointments Clause,
however, contains no comparable default rule requiring the Senate to
act on presidential nominations; accordingly, the Senate is free to
39
reject presidential nominations through inaction.
The Framers did provide a bypass provision for appointments
subject to the Senate’s approval, but unlike the default rule governing
presidential inaction on a bill, that provision does not provide a
default rule declaring that inaction by the Senate constitutes consent
40
to an appointment. The Recess Appointments Clause instead
permits the President to make time-limited appointments without the
41
Senate’s consent. The President may make such appointments only
“during the Recess of the Senate,” and these appointments expire
42
automatically at the end of the Senate’s next session. Thus, the
Recess Appointments Clause, as written, constitutes an imperfect
mechanism for bypassing an intransigent Senate’s refusal to consider
a presidential nomination.
Given the specificity of the Presentment Clause, however, in
setting fixed time limits for presidential action on a bill that both
houses of Congress have passed—and the corresponding lack of any
temporal limits on the Senate’s consideration of presidential
nominations that require the Senate’s approval in the Appointments
Clause—one must conclude that the Framers intended to give the
Senate an unreviewable veto power over presidential nominations
through the expedient of simply not voting on a pending
43
nomination. This intuitive judgment, premised on the Constitution’s
38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
39. But cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers
Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940, 946–49, 952–57 (2013) (arguing that
the President may deem the Senate to have approved senior principal executive-branch
nominations if the Senate fails to vote on such nominations on a timely basis).
40. Cf. id. at 946, 950–58 (observing that the Appointments Clause does not explicitly state
that the President may not unilaterally deem Senate inaction a form of implied consent, and
proposing that Senate inaction should constitute implied or de facto consent to presidential
nominations of senior principal officers).
41. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which
shall expire at the End of their next Session.”).
42. Id.
43. But cf. Roberts, supra note 30, at 725–28, 745, 750 (arguing that the federal courts
should permit the President to use the Recess Appointments Clause to fill vacancies in the
executive branch even when the Senate holds regular pro forma sessions). Professor Roberts
objects that “if the Supreme Court were also to uphold the validity of the Senate’s pro forma
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text, finds further confirmation in consistent practice over time:
simply put, in over 225 years, no President has claimed that the
Senate’s failure to vote on a particular nomination within a time
certain constituted a form of de facto consent to the appointment.
Nor, in the over 225 intervening years, has the Constitution been
amended to provide the President with broader authority to bypass
an intransigent Senate; if such a power were necessary to ensure the
smooth functioning of the executive branch, it seems likely that an
appropriate amendment would have been drafted, debated, and
44
enacted. In fact, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment—a relatively recent
amendment to the Constitution ratified in 1967—provides for a
maximum twenty-one-day period during which the Vice President,
with the support of a majority of the principal officers within the
executive branch, may act as President over the President’s objection.
If Congress fails to decide the issue within twenty-one days after
being notified of the President’s alleged incapacity, the President is
45
restored to office automatically.
Thus, the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment provides clear default rules that require joint action by
the Vice President, the cabinet, and Congress to remove a sitting
President other than by impeachment.
In sum, the Constitution and subsequent amendments provide
for default rules in some cases, but not in others; impasses over
presidential appointments fall into the latter category, not the former.
That the Constitution does not require Senate action on presidential
session in blocking the President’s appointment power . . . the recess appointments power could
be extinguished altogether.” Id. at 745. Of course, the Supreme Court has done just that—and
the Senate does now enjoy the ability to block recess appointments by making itself constantly
available to receive and consider nominations. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning,
134 S. Ct. 2550, 2555 (2014) (holding that “[f]or purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause,
the Senate is in session when it says that it is, provided that, under its own rules, it retains the
capacity to transact Senate business”); see also id. at 2573–77 (holding that the federal courts
should defer to the Senate’s own determination of when it is in session, and hence available to
receive and consider nominations, unless the Senate cannot undertake these duties despite
being nominally in session).
44. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (providing for presidential succession on the death of the
President, for appointment of a new Vice President with the advice and consent of both houses
of Congress, and for the involuntary removal of the President under certain conditions).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment is a very odd
constitutional duck. Section Four essentially provides a means of staging a constitutionally
sanctioned coup d’état—provided that the Vice President can secure the support of a majority
of the principal officers within the executive branch and two-thirds majorities of both houses of
Congress. See id. The Amendment actually permits the Vice President to seize power for up to
twenty-one days with the concurrence of a majority of the principal officers within the executive
branch and without any action by Congress. Id.
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nominations—much less action within a fixed time period—indicates
that the Senate does not have a constitutional duty to act on such
nominations.
But this is not the end of the matter. Article II plainly
presupposes that the President will enjoy the assistance of
subordinates in “tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully
46
executed” —subordinates from whom he can demand “Opinion[s], in
47
writing.” In addition, specific powers delegated to the President
cannot all be personally discharged by him, notably including control
over foreign affairs and the military forces of the United States.
The Framers, in blending responsibility for federal appointments,
created the possibility of a constitutional impasse between the
President and the Senate without providing a rule of decision for
resolving such impasses. No amount of close reading of the
Constitution’s text will resolve this problem; for constitutional
conflicts of this sort, to advance one set of priorities is to do violence
to another.
B. Embracing the Second-Best Solution: Using Constitutional
Practice to Resolve Conflicts Inherent in the Constitution’s Text
As Professor Akhil Amar has astutely observed, “Good
48
interpreters need to know when and how to read between the lines.”
Reading between the lines, however, will not resolve the problem of
overlapping constitutional responsibilities vested in different
branches. This Section argues that, when faced with conflicting
textual commands, a reviewing court must accept that only secondbest solutions exist for resolving the conflict—the first and best (if
elusive) solution being a clearly dictated textual resolution within the
49
four corners of the Constitution itself. With respect to the inherent
structural conflict that the Framers created in the context of the
federal appointments process, considering how the President and
Congress have actually operationalized the appointments process
over time arguably constitutes the most promising second-best

46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
47. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
48. Amar, supra note 34, at 827.
49. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 431 (“One need not be committed to a
rigorous program of textualist originalism to agree that if the constitutional text clearly and
straightforwardly answers a particular question, the burden of proof required to credit any
argument for departing from that answer will—and should—be very heavy.”).
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solution. The other alternatives, such as an open-ended cost-benefit
analysis of the President’s need for a particular appointee versus the
imperative of honoring the Senate’s role in the appointments
50
process, seem far worse.
Because the Constitution itself does not provide a bypass
51
mechanism for presidential appointments, it is inevitable that
disputes will arise between the President and the Senate over the
Senate’s failure to consider and approve presidential nominees. The
question then becomes: What kinds of self-help might the President
be able to deploy? And what constitutional predicate—if any—could
the President assert in support of such unilateral action?
At this point, one’s general attitude toward the proper framing
metrics for resolving separation-of-powers questions becomes acutely
important. Two general approaches exist and find support in both the
52
U.S. Reports and in major law reviews: formalism and functionalism.
Formalism generally relies on the Constitution’s allocation of
particular powers and duties to create mandatory lines of
demarcation that federal courts must strictly enforce: neither the
reallocation of a power from one branch to another
(aggrandizement), nor efforts to deny a power given to a particular
53
branch without reallocating it (encroachment), should be tolerated.
Formalism relies on a kind of textualist analysis and places great

50. See Stephenson, supra note 39, at 946–58. For example, Professor Matthew Stephenson
would limit his proposal for finding “tacit consent,” id. at 973, to appointments to senior
principal offices, those which are “indispensible [sic] to carrying out the core programs and
missions of the executive branch,” id. at 974, and enjoy significant policymaking authority;
significantly, he would not permit the use of a legal fiction to appoint federal judges for
“principally pragmatic” reasons, id. For further explanation of his proposal, see id. at 946, 973–
78.
51. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
52. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 608–09 (2001) (distinguishing between formalism and functionalism in
the separation-of-powers context); Magill, supra note 14, at 1136–48 (same). For a general
discussion of formalism and functionalism as competing theories for framing and deciding
contested separation-of-powers questions, see Krotoszynski, supra note 29, at 1611–15.
53. Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is To Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 870–79 (2009)
(discussing the salience of the concepts of encroachment and aggrandizement to both formalist
and functionalist separation-of-powers analysis); Magill, supra note 52, at 626–33 (same);
Manning, supra note 5, at 1944, 2021–22 (discussing formalism and the concept of interbranch
encroachment). Dean Magill notes that “[t]he Supreme Court has frequently observed that the
structural provisions of the Constitution are intended to prevent encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another.” Magill, supra note 52, at 627 n.66.
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structural weight on the Vesting Clauses of Articles I, II, and III. In
consequence, formalism tends to prioritize close textual readings of
the Constitution over constitutional conventions developed through
55
consistent practice over time. Moreover, strong formalists would
permit recourse to historical practice only as a means of ascertaining
the “original intent” of the Framers, and not as a means of
56
supplementing or displacing that intent.
Functionalists, in contrast, tend to generalize the underlying
purposes of specific constitutional assignments of powers to particular
57
branches and then balance such textual commitments with a larger,
and more pressing, commitment to creating an effective and efficient
58
federal government. As Professor John Manning describes this
approach, “functionalists view the Constitution as emphasizing the
59
balance, and not the separation, of powers.” Dean Elizabeth Magill
notes that the goal of functionalist analysis is “to achieve an
appropriate balance of power among the three spheres of
60
government.”
54. Jellum, supra note 53, at 854, 861; see Lawson, supra note 5, at 859 (noting that
“formalism is inextricably tied to both textualism and originalism”).
55. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550–54 (1994). As Calabresi and Prakash state the
proposition, “First and foremost, in interpreting text, commonsensically enough, one ought to
begin with the text.” Id. at 550. Moreover, “One should have recourse to history only where one
could assert plausibly that an ambiguity exists.” Id. But in setting forth a hierarchy of
interpretive resources, history and consistent practice appear at the very end of a four-point list
because “[s]uch history is the least reliable source for recovering the original meaning of the
law, but may in some instances help us recover the original understanding of an otherwise
unfathomable and obscure text.” Id. at 553. The problem, of course, is that ascertaining meaning
through recourse to legislative history is a notoriously difficult task—in many cases, even the
proponents of a particular rule understood the rule differently. Moreover, this approach to
constitutional interpretation ignores the fact that the Framers built deliberate ambiguity—
indeed, conflict—into the text. In light of this fact, the kind of originalism that Calabresi and
Prakash advocate simply opens the door to naked exercises of judicial policymaking because of
the absence of any real objective constraints rooted in neutral principles. Cf. Bradley &
Morrison, supra note 1, at 414–15 (advocating a careful, context-sensitive analysis of historical
practice to inform separation-of-powers doctrine in cases in which the Constitution itself does
not yield clear answers to contested separation-of-powers questions).
56. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 55, at 550–53.
57. See Manning, supra note 5, at 1950 (noting that “[f]unctionalists believe that the
Constitution’s structural clauses ultimately supply few useful details of meaning”).
58. Jellum, supra note 53, at 854–55. For an example of an iconic functionalist opinion, see
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967–72, 983–87 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). Professor Manning
argues that “Justice White’s dissent typifies modern functionalism,” Manning, supra note 5, at
1956, and presents a “classic example of functionalist generality shifting,” id. at 1955.
59. Manning, supra note 5, at 1952.
60. Magill, supra note 14, at 1142–43.

KROTOSZYNSKI IN PRINTER FINAL (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

TRANSCENDING FORMALISM

5/7/2015 6:37 PM

1529

To be sure, the specificity of a particular delegation and the
centrality of a power to a particular branch are important
considerations in a functionalist analysis of a novel administrative
61
structure. A balancing exercise is almost always requisite, however,
and to say that something must be taken into account is not to say
that it must be given controlling weight in the analysis. Thus, for a
functionalist, even radical departures from the Framers’
constitutional design might be justified under the right conditions.
For example, a functionalist analysis might permit Congress to
give the President alone the power to appoint principal officers within
the executive branch in the event of a terrorist attack that causes mass
casualties in Washington, D.C. For a formalist, on the other hand,
exigent circumstances would almost never justify failing to satisfy the
formal requirements of Article II, Section 2; even if compelling
exigent circumstances existed, the President could not appoint
62
principal officers without the advice and consent of the Senate. But
when the Constitution expresses conflicting textual commitments, a
reviewing court may not legitimately choose which constitutional
command it will observe and enforce; the court has a duty to take all
relevant provisions into account. In considering such questions, it
seems both practical and quite logical to consider how the political
branches themselves have gone about operationalizing the textually
conflicting constitutional provisions.

61. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693–97 (1988) (rejecting a separation-ofpowers challenge to the appointment of an independent counsel because the powers of this
office were sufficiently limited in scope to survive a functionalist balancing analysis, and holding
that the independent-counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act gave “the Executive
Branch sufficient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the President [wa]s able
to perform his constitutionally assigned duties”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850–57 (1986) (upholding an assignment of certain common-law
counterclaims to an administrative agency because the assignment did not implicate a core
function of the Article III courts and therefore did “not contravene separation of powers
principles or Article III”); cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As I have said,
however, it is ultimately irrelevant how much the statute reduces Presidential control. The case
is over when the Court acknowledges, as it must, that ‘[i]t is undeniable that the Act reduces the
amount of control or supervision that the Attorney General and, through him, the President
exercises over the investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal activity.’”
(citation omitted)).
62. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1523–24 (1991) (noting that “[t]hose who espouse the formalist view of separated powers
seek judicial legitimacy by insisting upon a firm textual basis in the Constitution for any
governmental act,” and observing that “formalists attempt to ensure that exercise of
governmental power comports strictly with the original blueprint laid down in articles I, II, and
III of the Constitution”).
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Thus, even if consistent practice by the President and Congress
does not formally bind a reviewing court, some measure of deference
would seem requisite if the resolution presents a workable and
reasonable solution to the problem. This is not to say that the federal
courts can shirk their constitutional obligation to “say what the law
63
is,” but rather to say that in the absence of a clear outcome rooted in
the Constitution’s text, practice represents the most logical—and least
subjective—next-best source of meaning.
Judges must not craft a set of constitutional conventions
64
governing the appointments process from whole cloth. But when the
Constitution points in radically different directions—and fails to
harmonize conflicting priorities—using historical practice as a kind of
“tiebreaker” reduces, rather than enhances, the problem of judicial
discretion. This approach also alleviates the risk of judicial
overreaching (which would arise if judges were to construe the
separation of powers ahistorically and without regard to
65
constitutional conventions).
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF NOEL CANNING AND ITS LANDMARK
GLOSS ON THE RECESS APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
Before proceeding to consider Noel Canning’s implications for
separation-of-powers theory and practice, some consideration of the
decision’s facts and holding is requisite. This Part considers the
factual background of Noel Canning, the dueling opinions authored
by Justices Breyer and Scalia, and how and why both these opinions
generally reflect formalist (rather than functionalist) methodology
and reasoning.

63. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 78,
supra note 16, at 466–67 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that courts must decline to apply and
enforce laws that violate the Constitution because “[l]imitations of this kind can be preserved in
practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void”). Hamilton argues that
in the absence of a federal judiciary vested with the power of judicial review, “all the
[Constitution’s] reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.” Id. at
466.
64. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., John S. Stone Chair Inaugural Lecture: A Man for All
Seasons: Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. and the Quest To Secure the Rule of Law, 61 ALA. L. REV.
165, 184 (2009) (arguing that “the imprecision that exists in interpreting constitutional text is not
a license for simply writing one’s own personal morality into the document”).
65. See Vermeule, supra note 21, at 1166–68, 1181–86 (discussing the development and
importance of conventions in creating and maintaining governmental structures and practices).
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A. The Factual Background and Lower-Court Holding in
Noel Canning
The facts at issue in Noel Canning are straightforward. After
having active nominations to the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) pending before the Senate for over a year, on January 4,
2012, President Obama invoked his power to appoint principal
officers of the United States during periods when the Senate is in
66
recess and purported to recess-appoint three new members to the
67
NLRB. The Senate had, in fact, met in “pro forma” sessions on
68
January 3 and January 6, 2012; if these sessions counted as bona fide
meetings of the Senate, then the Senate had been in recess for less
than twenty-four hours at the time the President purported to recess69
appoint the new NLRB members.
The Obama Administration took the legal position that it could
simply disregard the Senate’s pro forma sessions; the President
determined that the Senate had recessed on December 17, 2011, and
would not reconvene to take up ordinary business until January 23,
70
2012 (a recess of almost one month). Thus, according to the
administration’s math, the Senate had been in recess for seventeen
days when the President invoked his recess-appointments power.
In support of its decision to disregard the Senate’s pro forma
sessions, the administration relied on an opinion offered by Assistant
Attorney General Virginia A. Seitz, who headed the Office of Legal
71
Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice. OLC took the position
that because the Senate itself claimed that there would be “no
66. The Recess Appointments Clause provides that “[t]he President shall have Power to fill
up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of their next Session.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
67. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557 (2014).
68. Id. (emphasis removed). The Senate first adopted the practice of holding pro forma
sessions in 2007, in order to block Republican President George W. Bush from using recess
appointments to staff vacant executive and judicial offices. Roberts, supra note 30, at 747 (“Pro
forma recesses to prevent recess appointments were first used in 2007 by the Democratic
majority in the Senate to block recess appointments by President Bush, and the tactic was
successful in that it deterred the President from attempting recess appointments.”); Carl Hulse,
Loneliest Man in Town? He’s on the Senate Floor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, at A16.
69. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557.
70. Id.; see also Bryan J. Leitch, NLRB v. Noel Canning: The Separation-of-Powers
Dialogue Continues, 2014 CATO S. CT. REV. 221, 223–26, 242 (2014) (providing a comprehensive
factual background to Noel Canning and the Senate’s use of pro forma sessions to block recess
appointments).
71. See Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate
Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2012).
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business conducted” during these pro forma sessions, the President
72
could simply ignore them —even though the Senate had in fact
73
conducted regular legislative business during the pro forma sessions.
Professor Jonathan Turley strongly criticizes the administration’s
constitutional logic, arguing that OLC’s “position erases any real
74
consideration of duration [of a recess] from the calculus.” Turley
posits that this approach “effectively say[s] that the President decides
what a session is for the purposes of the Clause,” and that the
President may ignore pro forma sessions because “these are not
75
sessions to the satisfaction of the President.”
In consequence of the President’s bold action, the subsequent
actions of the NLRB were subject to attack on the theory that the
agency lacked a quorum if one disregarded the NLRB’s improperly
76
appointed members. This was precisely the ground on which Noel
Canning sought to fend off labor union charges that it had unlawfully
77
failed to engage in collective bargaining with its employee union.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
agreed with Noel Canning’s position that President Obama’s recess
78
appointments were legally invalid. It reasoned that because the
NLRB seats became vacant during a period when the Senate was in
session, the President could not fill the vacancies through recess
79
appointments. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and

72. See id. at 19–21.
73. See Leitch, supra note 70, at 223–25.
74. Turley, supra note 26, at 994.
75. Id. at 991.
76. The Supreme Court, in an earlier opinion, had held that the NLRB must have at least
three members in order to transact business. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. Nat’l Labor
Relations Bd., 560 U.S. 674, 679–82, 687–88 (2010). Writing for the New Process Steel majority,
Justice Stevens explained that “[i]f Congress had intended to authorize two members alone to
act for the Board on an ongoing basis, it could have said so in straightforward language.” Id. at
681. Accordingly, “the Board quorum requirement and the three-member delegation clause
should not be read as easily surmounted technical obstacles of little or no import.” Id. at 687–88.
77. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2557 (2014) (“The
[NLRB] found that a Pepsi-Cola distributor, Noel Canning, had unlawfully refused to reduce to
writing and execute a collective-bargaining agreement with a labor union.”).
78. See Noel Canning v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 705 F.3d 490, 507–12 (D.C. Cir. 2013),
aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (holding that the recess appointments were invalid).
79. See id. at 514 (“Even if the ‘End’ of the session were ‘during the Recess,’ . . . we hold
that the appointment to that seat is invalid because the President must make the recess
appointment during the same intersession recess when the vacancy for that office arose.”).
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voted 9–0 to affirm the D.C. Circuit’s resolution of the case —but not
its reasoning. The Justices divided 5–4 on how broadly to construe the
81
scope of the Recess Appointments Clause.
B. Justice Breyer’s Pragmatic Formalism
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion set out to answer three
questions. First, may the President make recess appointments during
an adjournment within a session of the Senate, or as the D.C. Circuit
held, only during an intersession recess after the Senate adjourns sine
82
die? Second, may the President use the recess-appointments power
to fill offices that become vacant during a session of the Senate (that
83
is, what do the words “may happen” mean)? Third, and finally, if
intrasession recess appointments are constitutional, what is the
minimum period of recess required for the Clause to apply, and
relatedly, does the Senate or the President determine when the
84
Senate is in session? Methodologically, Justice Breyer placed
significant reliance on text, history, and practice; no one factor enjoys
85
controlling weight.

80. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2578 (holding that the Recess Appointments Clause did
not empower the President to make the relevant appointments); see also id. at 2592 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (agreeing).
81. Compare infra notes 82–117 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion’s
analysis), with notes 118–37 and accompanying text (discussing the concurring opinion’s
analysis).
82. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J., majority opinion) (“Does [‘recess of
the Senate’] refer only to an inter-session recess (i.e., a break between formal sessions of
Congress), or does it also include an intra-session recess, such as a summer recess in the midst of
a session?”).
83. See id. (“Does [‘vacancies that may happen’] refer only to vacancies that first come into
existence during a recess, or does it also include vacancies that arise prior to a recess but
continue to exist during the recess?”).
84. See id. at 2557 (“In calculating the length of a recess, are we to ignore the pro forma
sessions, thereby treating the series of brief recesses as a single, month-long recess?”); see also
Leitch, supra note 70, at 227–28 (discussing the cert. phase of Noel Canning in some detail and
noting that although the Obama Administration “sought review of only two questions,” Noel
Canning succeeded in adding a critical third question—namely, “Whether the President’s
recess-appointment power may be exercised when the Senate is convening every three days in
pro forma sessions,” even though the D.C. Circuit “had not addressed that issue”). The
Supreme Court granted review of the question regarding the effect of the Senate’s pro forma
sessions over the Obama Administration’s objections. Id. at 228. This question proved to be
outcome-determinative. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2574–78.
85. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2558–59 (noting that the Recess Appointments Clause
“reflects the tension between, on the one hand, the President’s continuous need for ‘the
assistance of subordinates’ and, on the other, the Senate’s practice, particularly during the
Republic’s early years, of meeting for a single brief session each year” (citation omitted)); id. at
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Justice Breyer opined that the President may make recess
appointments during intrasession breaks and not only during
intersession breaks. He explained that “[i]n our view, the phrase ‘the
86
recess’ includes an intrasession recess of substantial length.” After
87
analyzing “[f]ounding-era dictionaries,” common usage of the term
88
“recess” in the early years of the federal government, and historical
89
practice over time, the majority found that the “constitutional text
90
is . . . ambiguous” and concluded that the better approach reads “the
91
Recess” as applicable to “both intra-session and inter-session
92
recesses.”
Justice Breyer then considered what, if any, limits apply to
making intrasession recess appointments. Using an intratextual mode
93
of analysis, he concluded that “a recess of more than 3 days but less
94
than 10 days is presumptively too short to fall within the Clause.” He
derived the three-day lower limit from the Constitution’s requirement
that the Senate obtain the consent of the House if it wishes to recess
95
for more than three days during a session. This approach makes
sense: a recess too brief to require the consent of the other chamber
does not constitute a sufficient interruption of the Senate’s ability to
receive and consider nominations to permit the President to invoke
96
the recess-appointments power. The ten-day minimum period

2559 (arguing that it is appropriate to “put significant weight upon historical practice” in setting
the metes and bounds of the President’s recess-appointments power).
86. Id. at 2561.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2561–62.
89. Id. at 2562–65.
90. Id. at 2561.
91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
92. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2561–62, 2567.
93. See Amar, supra note 34, at 791–95 (discussing various types of intratextual approaches
to interpreting constitutional text).
94. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2567.
95. See id. at 2566–67 (concluding that a Senate recess that is short enough to avoid the
consent of the House does not trigger the Recess Appointments Clause); see also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of
the other, adjourn for more than three days.”).
96. But see Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2599 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Fumbling for some
textually grounded standard, the majority seizes on the Adjournments Clause, which bars either
House from adjourning for more than three days without the other’s consent.”). Justice Scalia
rejects an intratextual reading of the Recess Appointments and Adjournments Clauses, arguing
that “the dramatically different contexts in which the two clauses operate make importing the 3day limit from the Adjournments Clause into the Recess Appointments Clause ‘both arbitrary
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derives from the practice of past presidents; with very few exceptions,
presidents have not made recess appointments during breaks of less
97
than ten days.
Significantly, the majority’s bright-line rule of a minimum tenday recess would seem to apply to both intrasession and intersession
breaks: “If a Senate recess is so short that it does not require the
consent of the House, it is too short to trigger the Recess
Appointments Clause,” and “a recess lasting less than 10 days is
98
presumptively too short as well.”
With respect to the second question—whether a vacancy must
arise during a recess of the Senate—Justice Breyer concluded that
both the broader purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause and
the imperatives of Article II would be better served through a
99
broader interpretation of the phrase “may happen.” As he
explained, the Recess Appointments Clause exists “to permit the
President to obtain the assistance of subordinate officers when the
100
Senate, due to its recess, cannot confirm them.” To restrict the
Clause only to vacancies that come into existence during a recess of
the Senate “would prevent the President from making any recess
appointment that arose before a recess, no matter who the official, no
matter how dire the need, no matter how uncontroversial the
appointment, and no matter how late in the last session the office fell
101
vacant.”
Ensuring the “President’s control and political
accountability” requires that he have the ability to rely on persons of
his own choosing, rather than career service personnel designated to

and mistaken.’” Id. (quoting Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess
Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1556 (2005)).
97. See id. at 2567 (majority opinion). The majority acknowledged that a very small
number of counterexamples exist, but explained that “when considered against 200 years of
settled practice, we regard these few scattered examples as anomalies.” Id.
98. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Breyer did not draw any distinction between an
intersession recess and an intrasession recess of less than ten days’ duration; in either case, the
recess-appointment power would be unavailable to the President. Justice Scalia, on the other
hand, would permit only intersession recess appointments, but would permit them “even during
very short inter-session breaks.” Id. at 2599 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring). In this particular, then,
Justice Scalia’s approach actually offers the President broader authority to circumvent the
Senate’s role in the appointments process than does the majority’s approach.
99. See id. at 2567–68 (majority opinion) (concluding that the Recess Appointments Clause
applies both to vacancies that arise before a recess and those that remain during the recess).
100. Id. at 2568.
101. Id. at 2569–70.
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102

serve in an acting capacity. Indeed, the majority invoked Free
103
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in
support of the proposition that the President must retain sufficient
control and oversight over executive functions in order to be deemed
104
politically accountable for their operation.
To be sure, Justice Breyer acknowledged that broadly construing
the Recess Appointments Clause to reach intrasession breaks and
offices that have long been vacant creates some tension with the
105
Senate’s advice-and-consent power. But in reconciling the Senate’s
advice-and-consent power with the President’s obligations under the
Take Care Clause and the structural implications of a unitary
executive headed by a single officer—namely, the President—Justice
Breyer avoided empowering the Senate to cripple the executive
branch; he instead sought an appropriate accommodation, or balance,
106
between considerations that point in opposite directions.
Moreover, Justice Breyer did not embrace an abstract costbenefit analysis to reach these conclusions; his analysis relied first and
foremost on constitutional text. Only after carefully considering
whether the text has a clear and unambiguous meaning (it did not
with respect to the phrases “the Recess” and “may happen”) and the
conflicting textual mandates in Article II’s Recess Appointments and
Take Care Clauses, as well as the overall structural imperative of the
107
unitary executive, did Justice Breyer look to historical practice. As

102. Id. at 2569 (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 497–98 (2010)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 3345 (2012) (providing for the appointment of “[a]cting
officer[s]” to discharge some of the duties vested in an office subject to the Senate’s advice and
consent for appointments).
103. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
104. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2569 (discussing the implications of limiting “the
President’s control and political accountability”); see also Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 497–98
(describing the decline in accountability that results from restricting presidential oversight
powers).
105. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2569 (recognizing that interpreting the Recess
Appointments Clause broadly may “permit a President to avoid Senate confirmations as a
matter of course”).
106. See id. at 2577–78 (assuaging fears that the Court’s holding significantly amended the
constitutional balance between the branches of government); see also Leitch, supra note 70, at
251 (positing that Justice Breyer’s opinion was not merely about “achieving a workable
government or ensuring that each branch [is] able to perform its essential functions” but instead
“about the authority of each branch to define its own institutional identity”).
107. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2561–63, 2567–70 (considering historical practice and
conventions only after determining that the text itself was ambiguous and susceptible of more
than one plausible interpretation); cf. id. at 2574 (finding that the Constitution’s text clearly and
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one commentator has observed, “In seamlessly blending these
functionalist and formalist rationales, Justice Breyer’s opinion
108
challenges the integrity of the distinction.”
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, in answering the third
question, Justice Breyer concluded that the Senate, not the President,
109
may determine when it is in session. He explained that the
Constitution “gives the Senate wide latitude to determine whether
110
and when to have a session, as well as how to conduct the session.”
Accordingly, “the Senate’s determination about what constitutes a
111
session should merit great respect.” The conclusion necessarily
follows, then, that “the Senate is in session when it says it is, provided
that, under its own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate
112
business.”
This portion of the opinion places strong weight on Article I,
Section 5, Clause 2, which states that each house may “determine the
113
Rules of its Proceedings.” The Constitution also vests the Senate
114
with considerable discretion to control its own schedule. Because
the Senate may both receive and consider nominations during its pro
forma sessions, and has in fact conducted major legislative business
during such meetings, the Senate’s position that it was not in recess
for more than three-day periods in late 2011 and early 2012 was given
115
determinative weight. In the absence of a recess of more than ten
days, then, the President could not constitutionally make the
116
contested recess appointments to the NLRB. This aspect of the
majority’s decision effectively vests the Senate with the ability to

unambiguously vests the Senate with the power to determine its own schedule and operating
rules and, accordingly, declining to consider historical practice and conventions).
108. Leitch, supra note 70, at 242; see EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT:
RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE 12 (2005) (arguing that outdated
analytical constructs must be abandoned or updated to fit new circumstances in order to ensure
that administrative law effectively addresses contemporary problems and issues).
109. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2573–77 (holding that “the Senate is in session when it
says it is, provided that, under its own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate business”).
110. Id. at 2574.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
114. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (empowering each house of Congress to adjourn).
115. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2574–76 (concluding that “the Senate’s determination
about what constitutes a session should merit great respect”).
116. Id. at 2573–77.
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block recess appointments by remaining open for business (even if it
117
does so through so-called pro forma sessions).
C. Justice Scalia’s Textualism Masquerading as Formalism
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Alito, would have affirmed the D.C. Circuit’s highly
circumscribed reading of the Recess Appointments Clause. He would
have reached this outcome by limiting the Clause to only intersession
118
recesses (of whatever length) and by permitting such appointments
only for vacancies that come into existence during the Senate’s
119
intersession recess. So construed, the Clause would be effectively
meaningless—unless, of course, the President sought to time
resignations to take effect during intersession recesses and made
appointments a nanosecond after accepting the carefully timed
resignation.
In Justice Scalia’s view, the words “recess” and “may happen”
are not ambiguous but have clear, discernable meanings. He
specifically rejected the majority’s textual analysis of the phrase “may
120
happen” as “awkward and unnatural,” and argued that “it is clear
that the Constitution authorizes the President to fill unilaterally only
those vacancies that arise during a recess, not every vacancy that
121
happens to exist during a recess.” Justice Scalia accused the
majority of manufacturing ambiguity in the constitutional text when
none existed. He wryly observed that “[w]hat the majority needs to
sustain its judgment is an ambiguous text and a clear historical

117. It also gives the House a say in the use of recess appointments. Article I provides that
each house of Congress must agree to the other’s recessing for more than three days—well
under the ten-day minimum recess period that Noel Canning requires to trigger the President’s
recess-appointments authority. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (documenting the adjournment
requirements). Thus, if the House of Representatives refuses to give its consent to a recess of
the Senate exceeding three days, the Senate may not constitutionally adjourn. Interestingly, in
the event of an impasse between the House and the Senate regarding a recess, the Constitution
vests the President with the power to resolve the dispute; the President would presumably take
the Senate’s side if he wished to make recess appointments. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3
(empowering the President to adjourn Congress in the event of a disagreement). To be clear,
however, the President does not have any general power to force the Senate into a recess
against its will.
118. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2595–98 (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 2607–08.
120. Id. at 2595–2600 (opining that “recess” has a plain meaning and refers only to
intersession recesses); id. at 2606–10 (opining that “may happen” can refer only to vacancies
that come into existence during a recess).
121. Id. at 2610.
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122

practice,” but argued that “[w]hat it has is a clear text and an at123
best-ambiguous historical practice.” Justice Scalia charged that
Justice Breyer and the majority had embraced an “adverse-possession
124
theory of executive power,” an approach that runs a substantial risk
of “aggrandizing the Presidency beyond its constitutional bounds and
125
undermining respect for the separation of powers.”
The irony of Justice Scalia’s approach is that it would not, in
practice, prove any more effective at protecting the Senate’s
prerogative over presidential appointments than the majority’s
approach (which essentially gives the Senate an unfettered ability to
block all recess appointments, including intersession recess
appointments, by holding sessions in which it could, in theory,
conduct business at least once every nine days). Unlike Justice Scalia,
the majority empowers the Senate, if it wishes, to essentially nullify
the recess-appointments power—but it also permits the Senate to give
the President leeway to make such appointments (by not holding
sessions at least every nine days), an outcome that would seem to
better protect the Senate’s advice-and-consent prerogative than
Justice Scalia’s approach. The majority’s ten-day rule better
safeguards against presidential self-help by applying the minimumten-day-recess rule to any and all recesses of the Senate—including
intersession recesses.
Moreover, Justice Scalia’s approach to the recess-appointments
question largely ignores the imperatives of Article II’s Vesting and
126
Take Care Clauses (and arguably the Opinions Clause as well). The

122. Id. at 2617.
123. Id.
124. Id. Professor Turley first coined this characterization of President Obama’s attempted
use of the recess-appointments power. See Turley, supra note 26, at 971–72, 975 (describing the
President’s attempted use of the recess-appointments power to bypass the Senate, and rejecting
“the claim that somehow the Executive Branch has acquired title to a power of Congress by
adversely occupying the area of recess appointments”); see also id. at 1030–34 (discussing and
comparing the President’s “adverse possession” of the recess-appointments power with the
common law property doctrine). Even so, Justice Scalia did not cite Turley’s work in his Noel
Canning opinion.
125. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2618. For a highly persuasive rejoinder to Justice Scalia’s
adverse possession argument, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil A. Siegel, After Recess: Historical
Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2015 SUP. CT. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 42–45), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2547962.
126. In fairness to Justice Scalia, he does suggest that the use of acting appointments could
be used to ensure presidential control of federal administrative agencies. See Noel Canning, 134
S. Ct. at 2609–10 (describing the president’s authority to appoint “acting” officers to fill
vacancies). But such appointments will not work for independent federal agencies, such as the
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plain text of Article II presupposes that the President will be able to
127
call on subordinate executive officers—“Heads of Departments.”
Yet, if the Senate refuses to confirm any appointees to these offices,
the executive power cannot really be said to be vested in the
President—Congress has encroached on this authority, and essentially
dissipated the executive power, by preventing the President from
128
staffing principal offices within the executive branch. Other directly
129
vested powers, such as control over the military forces and foreign
130
relations, also require subordinate officers within the executive
branch who are loyal and accountable to the President.
Justice Scalia simply does not address the critical relationship of
appointments to the exercise of these specifically delegated
presidential powers. Thus, the dissent largely misses the forest—
namely, the Framers’ structural design, which requires the President
to ensure enforcement of federal law and to conduct the nation’s
131
diplomatic and military affairs. It instead focuses on a single tree—
the Recess Appointments Clause and the general requirement that
NLRB, that feature collective agency heads. A staff member at the NLRB, or even members
comprising less than a quorum, may not legally act on behalf of the agency. See New Process
Steel, L.P. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 560 U.S. 674, 687–88 (2010) (discussing and strictly
enforcing the Board’s quorum requirements). Such officers also lack the imprimatur of a
presidential appointment and the Senate’s advice and consent; these facts could weaken their
efficacy. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions,
82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 981–84 (2009) (discussing the importance of political accountability,
political legitimacy, and expertise in high-ranking executive officers, and noting that although
acting officers often possess expertise, they usually lack the other attributes).
127. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 324–27 (2012)
(discussing the meaning and importance of the Opinions Clause). Amar argues that the
Opinions Clause serves to help secure responsibility and accountability for the executive branch
by preventing the President from disclaiming personal responsibility for the actions of his
subordinates; as Amar states the proposition, “the buck stops with him.” Id. at 327.
128. See AMAR, supra note 127, at 327 (positing that the “big idea behind the opinions
clause” relates to presidential accountability—namely, that “a president could never claim that
his hands were tied because he had been outvoted or overridden by his advisers in a secret
conference”).
129. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that “[t]he President shall be Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States”).
130. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the President “shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, . . . and he shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls”).
131. See J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162, 1183–
94 (1989) (discussing the Constitution’s imposition of “mandatory” presidential duties, and
arguing that the Constitution requires the President to perform them, even if Congress elects
not to provide appropriations to fund the President’s constitutional obligations).
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the Senate consent to presidential appointments of executive-branch
132
officers and federal judges.
To be sure, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion does not mine
Article II as much as it could—beyond a passing reference to
presidential control and oversight, the majority opinion does not fully
engage the scope of the conflict between the Senate’s advice-and133
consent power and specific provisions of Article II. Nevertheless, a
plausible textualist opinion must, at a minimum, seek to engage all
the relevant constitutional text. This, however, Justice Scalia did not
do.
Moreover, Justice Scalia’s account of the absolute veto power
the Senate should hold over presidential appointments is
fundamentally inconsistent with his important and iconic defense of
the unitary executive in other contexts. Over time, Justice Scalia has
been a principal advocate of the unitary executive theory and of the
absolute necessity of ensuring that the president may personally
134
oversee and direct all operations of the executive branch. Thus, it
seems odd for Justice Scalia to say that Congress may not limit
135
presidential oversight of an independent counsel, but may force an
entire shutdown of the Department of Justice by refusing to confirm
any principal or inferior officers to staff it.
Principled formalism requires a reviewing court to consult all
relevant constitutional text. One must also carefully consider all of
the relevant structural implications of the Framers’ design for each of
the three coordinate branches of the federal government. A close
reading of the Appointments and Recess Appointments Clauses,
shorn of any effort to integrate these provisions within the larger
132. Ironically, even as Justice Scalia decried the majority’s substantial reliance on
conventions developed over time to inform the meaning and scope of the Recess Appointments
Clause, he himself relied on these very same materials to support his claim that the Clause has a
plain meaning with respect to both intrasession recess appointments and the use of recess
appointments to fill vacancies that come into being during a session of the Senate. See Nat’l
Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2596 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing
early opinions of the attorney general); id. at 2607–09 (invoking the early practice of presidents
to support limiting recess appointments to offices that become vacant while the Senate is in an
intersession recess). Practice is either relevant, or it is not; so too, the constitutional text is either
unambiguous on its face, or it is not. Justice Scalia’s objection, then, seems to boil down to one
of scope rather than kind.
133. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2567–70.
134. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705–09 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. See id. at 705 (arguing that the Vesting Clause of Article II, Section 1, creates a unitary
Executive who holds the entire executive power, and that “this does not mean some of the
executive power, but all of the executive power”).
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constitutional framework, is simply not good formalist analysis—
indeed, it is not even good textualist analysis, for a close reading of
the text ought to require a close reading of all the relevant text.
Justice Scalia’s opinion largely abandons his longstanding
commitment to the textual and structural imperatives of Article II—
an odd result that might lead a skeptical observer to question whether
his more general commitment to a unitary executive extends to the
136
current occupant of the Oval Office.
More broadly, given that any reading of the Recess
Appointments Clause will inevitably leave both branches in
possession of plausible workaround devices, one also has to wonder
whether the whole game was worth the candle. Given that both
solutions leave the door open to clever shenanigans that honor the
text, but not the spirit, of the Recess Appointments Clause, it seems
plausible to ask whether the Justices should have simply left this
137
problem to the political branches to work out for themselves.
D. Squaring the Circle: Is Noel Canning a Formalist or
Functionalist Decision?
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion does not rest on a truly
functionalist analysis. To be sure, thoroughly functionalist approaches
to framing the Recess Appointments Clause not only existed, but also
found eager advocates within the scholarly community. If one views
the appointments process as “broken” and in need of “fixing,” very
broad forms of presidential self-help become desirable. Professor
Matthew Stephenson, for example, has posited that the Senate’s
failure to vote on a presidential nomination within a reasonable
period of time should be construed as a form of constructive

136. See also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521–22 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing President Obama for failing to adequately enforce the nation’s immigration laws).
137. See Huq, supra note 17, at 5–8. Of course, one of the virtues of Justice Breyer’s opinion
is that, although it does not reduce the Appointments Clause to a nullity, it leaves both branches
well armed to continue to engage in partisan conflict over appointments. It did not give the
President what he sought and what some legal academics advocated—the ability to make recess
appointments whenever a recess exists and without regard to whether the Senate is available to
receive and consider appointments. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 30, at 726–27, 750–52. As
Bryan Leitch observes, “Were the president able to trump the Senate’s own determination of
when it is or is not in recess, there is no principled reason for prohibiting the president from
independently deciding, for example, whether the Senate has given its advice and consent under
the Appointments Clause.” Leitch, supra note 70, at 252.
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138

Professor Stephenson, citing “[e]xcessive Senate
consent.
139
obstructionism,” argues that the Senate’s silence (that is, its failure
to vote on a pending nomination) should be construed as its de facto
140
consent (at least for senior posts within the executive branch). Thus,
“the ordinary meaning of the term, as well as its usage in law and
legislative practice, establishes that the text of Article II, Section 2
does not provide any prima facie reason to conclude that an
141
affirmative Senate confirmation vote is always necessary.”
Professor Stephenson’s proposal, of course, essentially reads the
consent requirement out of Article II, Section 2. It also ignores over
142
225 years of settled practice between the President and the Senate.
But from a truly functionalist perspective, the Senate’s ability to
143
impede—and perhaps cripple —the operation of a federal
administrative agency justifies broader and stronger forms of
presidential self-help. Other legal academics, including Professors
Peter Shane and John Roberts, have also argued that if the Senate
will not reliably vote on the President’s nominees, the President
144
should be able to install them without the Senate’s consent.
The standard route to this result is not by treating inaction as
consent (as Professor Stephenson proposes), but rather by torturing
the Recess Appointments Clause to permit the President to recessappoint executive officers when the Senate takes a lunch break. If the
138. See Stephenson, supra note 39, at 950–51 (arguing that “consent can be understood
either as requiring some affirmative, express act or declaration, or as something that can be
given tacitly, through inaction or failure to object, depending on context”).
139. Id. at 944.
140. See id. at 951–53 (positing that “tacit consent” should be deemed to satisfy the
imperatives of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, and noting that “[i]ndeed, a hoary English
common law maxim, derived from Roman law, asserts that qui tacet consentire videtur (‘one who
keeps silent is understood to consent’)”).
141. Id. at 953.
142. Presumably Professor Stephenson would not extend this argument to judicial
nominations, insofar as he rests his argument on the notion that the President cannot discharge
his constitutional duties without the assistance of subordinate executive officers. See id. at 953–
58 (arguing that the President’s “take care” duties under Article II permit him to treat Senate
inaction on executive-branch nominations as “tacit consent” to such nominations). Oddly,
however, Stephenson excludes judicial appointments from his theory of implied senatorial
consent for “primarily pragmatic” reasons related to their life tenure. See id. at 973–74
(explaining this exception); see also id. at 974 (“Article III judges, though appointed by the
President, perform a different constitutional function, and the Take Care Clause has little
bearing on how one should interpret the process for judicial appointments.”).
143. The President’s options for securing meaningful control over independent agencies are
far more limited than with respect to presidentially controlled departments. See supra note 126.
144. See infra notes 173–85 and accompanying text.
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President alone may determine when the Senate is in “recess,” then
no good reason exists to take the more radical step that Professor
Stephenson advocates. Moreover, the Constitution does not prohibit
successive recess appointments for the same person, holding the same
office; accordingly, the President could simply use successive recess
appointments, implemented whenever the Senate adjourns, to nullify
the clear constitutional command that the Senate agree to the
appointment of principal officers serving within the executive branch.
By contrast, Justice Breyer’s Noel Canning majority opinion is
strongly rooted in the text of the Constitution; only when the text was
145
ambiguous did he look to conventions established over time. His
146
opinion reflects a pragmatic form of formalist analysis; the decision
is simply too tightly tethered to the Constitution’s text—and to
147
enforcing the text as written —to pass muster as a functionalist
exercise. It also leaves open the real possibility of the Senate blocking
recess appointments by remaining available to receive and consider
nominations at least one out of every ten days. A functionalist
approach would attempt to find a more balanced point of equilibrium
between Congress and the President.
By way of contrast, Justice Scalia’s nominally concurring opinion
relies almost exclusively on a kind of originalist–textualist approach
to render the Recess Appointments Clause largely irrelevant to the
staffing of the executive branch. Even more than Justice Breyer’s
opinion, then, Justice Scalia’s approach is strikingly formalist in both
tone and result.

145. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561–62 (2014)
(observing that “[t]he constitutional text is thus ambiguous,” and consulting historical practice
to resolve this ambiguity); id. at 2567–70 (discerning ambiguity in the phrase “that may
happen,” and consulting historical practice to resolve this ambiguity); cf. id. at 2574 (holding
that “the Constitution explicitly empowers the Senate to ‘determine the Rules of its
Proceedings’”). As Professors Bradley and Siegel cogently observe, “Noel Canning exemplifies
how the constitutional text, perceptions about clarity or ambiguity, and ‘extra-textual’
considerations such as historical practice operate interactively rather than as separate elements
of interpretation.” Bradley & Siegel, supra note 125, at 55.
146. Martin H. Redish, Separation of Powers, Judicial Authority, and the Scope of Article III:
The Troubling Cases of Morrison and Mistretta, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 314–15 (1990)
(describing and advocating a pragmatic formalist approach to separation-of-powers questions,
and noting that such analysis includes “elements of common sense”).
147. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2573–77 (holding that Article I, Section 5, Clause 2,
vests the Senate with the power to adopt and enforce its own rules of procedure, including
decisions related to how to conduct its own sessions, and accordingly, that the Senate’s own
view of when it is in session should normally be controlling).
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Thus, both Noel Canning opinions are properly characterized as
formalist in character. An important distinction nonetheless exists:
Justice Breyer embraces a pragmatic approach to formalist analysis,
whereas Justice Scalia does not.
III. CONSIDERING THE PREDICTABLE FAILURES OF BOTH
FORMALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM
Neither formalism nor functionalism, strictly applied, will
provide reliable answers to difficult separation-of-powers questions.
In circumstances where the Constitution provides conflicting textual
mandates, formalism—particularly its strictest, originalist–textualist
variety—does not work. Strict formalism presupposes that the text
invariably offers clear answers, despite the fact that this is not always
so. On the other hand, functionalism tends to undervalue the
importance of text when the Constitution does offer clear rules of the
148
road. This Part considers how both traditional modes of separationof-powers analysis routinely fail to yield workable solutions to
difficult separation-of-powers problems.
Formalism, in its strictest form, reduces to a variation of
149
textualism. A more moderate approach to formalist separation-ofpowers analysis places some reliance on legislative-history materials
to clarify or resolve ambiguities that a reviewing court finds in the
150
Constitution’s text. But under this approach, legislative-history
materials are relevant only to ascertaining the “public meaning” of
the relevant text and only insofar as they “might shed light on the
original meaning the constitutional text had to those who wrote it into
151
law.” Both last and least, a reviewing court may consider historical
practice, but “[s]uch history is the least reliable source for recovering
152
the original meaning of the law.”
148. See infra notes 161–87 and accompanying text.
149. See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were To Govern”: The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 453–54, 495–96 (1991)
(characterizing originalist–textualist formalism as “epistemologically naïve” and “plagued by
the difficulties that plague originalism,” including “the many variations in opinions among the
Framers and the difficulty of extrapolating how the Framers would approach unforeseen
problems or take into account modern developments”); see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra
note 55, at 551 (arguing that “the text of the Constitution, as originally understood by the
people who ratified it, is the fundamental law of the land”).
150. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 55, at 552–53 (describing a “methodology of
originalism that sets out a hierarchy of originalist source materials”).
151. Id. at 553.
152. Id.

KROTOSZYNSKI IN PRINTER FINAL (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE)

1546

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

5/7/2015 6:37 PM

[Vol. 64:1513

Formalist analysis works quite well with respect to some
questions. For example, Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, expressly
requires a bill to be passed in both houses of Congress and presented
153
to the President “before it become a Law.” One need not consult
legislative history, materials from the Federal Convention, or
historical practice in order to ascertain this provision’s meaning and
effect—much less contemporary dictionaries from the time of the
154
framing.
Other provisions of the Constitution, such as the
155
minimum-age requirements for service in the House or Senate, are
equally easy to understand and do not require any interpretative
156
gymnastics.
These differences in specificity ought to play a significant role in
separation-of-powers doctrine. For example, Professor Manning
argues that the federal courts should strictly enforce specific
constitutional clauses that establish procedural requirements or vest
157
particular powers with a specific branch. On the other hand, when a
clause “is indeterminate—as the Vesting Clauses often (but not
always) are—interpreters have no basis to displace judgments made
by Congress pursuant to the express power delegated to it to compose
158
the government under the Necessary and Proper Clause.” Of

153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
154. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957–59 (1983).
155. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring that all members of the House be at least
twenty-five years old); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (requiring that all members of the Senate be
at least thirty years old).
156. But cf. JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE
AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 180 (2007)
(discussing the interesting case of Senator Rush Holt, who was elected to the Senate some seven
months before his thirtieth birthday and nevertheless was seated because he waited until after
his birthday to present his credentials to the Senate); RICHARD D. HUPMAN, SENATE
ELECTION, EXPULSION AND CENSURE CASES FROM 1789 TO 1960, at 135 (1962) (same). Thus,
even constitutional text that most people agree has a single, clear, and fixed meaning can give
rise to interpretive difficulties. In some respects, this is probably an unavoidable aspect of
language itself. See STANLEY E. FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 2–8, 12–14, 42–59
(1980) (arguing that words have meaning only within the context of a particular interpretive
community that agrees to give particular words and phrases a particular significance); STANLEY
FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING TOO 182–86 (1994)
(arguing that all legal texts are susceptible of multiple interpretations, positing that “one can
always find meanings in a text other than the ones intended by the author,” and arguing that
“since looking for evidence of intention is what every interpreter does, knowing that one is
doing it is no methodological advantage”). In fact, Fish asserts that “[f]ormalist literalist or ‘four
corners’ interpretation is not inadvisable . . . it is impossible.” Id. at 208.
157. Manning, supra note 5, at 1945–49, 2039–40.
158. Id. at 2040.
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course, “No interpretive method . . . is complication free.” The most
obvious complication with Manning’s principled formalism is that, to
use Manning’s own words, “the particular ways in which
constitutionmakers blended power . . . do not constitute a coherent
160
listing or grouping.”
Any textualist approach to enforcing the separation-of-powers
doctrine will fall short when the text itself allocates powers on a
shared, or blended, basis (as is the case with both the appointments
161
process and the war powers ). Yet, a principled form of
162
constitutional originalism
must frankly acknowledge that the
Framers intentionally introduced ambiguity into the document—and
did so without specifying how to disentangle conflicting and shared
163
powers. As Professor David Robertson observes, “the Constitution
created an ingenious national government of separated institutions
164
sharing powers” —that is, “a government of separate institutions,
165
each with the will and ability to defend its independence.”
I do not suggest that formalism never provides clear guidance,
but it does not invariably provide clear guidance. In light of this fact,
a sensible person sympathetic to formalism’s first-order concerns
166
should embrace a pragmatic variant of the doctrine. In this context,
pragmatism means straightforwardly acknowledging that the
Constitution’s text does not provide clear answers to all questions
regarding the power and authority of each branch, even though it
does make some mandatory allocations of powers among the three
branches.
Professor Martin Redish and Elizabeth Cisar have advocated
“pragmatic formalism,” by which they mean a variant of formalism
that “is a ‘street-smart’ mode of interpretation, growing out of a
recognition of the dangers . . . which a more ‘functional’ or ‘balancing’

159. Id. at 2039.
160. Id. at 2015.
161. See supra note 14.
162. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 55, at 551–52, 558–59.
163. See ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 235–36 (noting that “[t]he Framers’ Constitution
was deliberately unfinished, an incomplete framework for the future play of republican politics”
and that “the people’s conventions ratified the Constitution with all these ambiguities in
place”).
164. Id. at 233.
165. Id.
166. See generally Redish & Cisar, supra note 149, at 453–56, 474–78 (advocating a
“pragmatic formalist” approach to enforcing the separation-of-powers doctrine).
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analysis in the separation of powers context may create.” Pragmatic
formalism “recognizes that once a reviewing court begins down those
[functionalist] roads in the enforcement of separation of powers, no
168
meaningful limitations on interbranch usurpation of power remain.”
Accordingly, Redish and Cisar reject a strictly textualist approach to
formalism because it “represents a commitment to a rigidity and level
of abstraction that is quite probably not possible, and that is certainly
169
unwise.”
Importantly, their “pragmatic brand of formalism,
however, grows not out of a rejection of an inquiry into the social and
political purposes that underlie text, but out of a careful search for
170
them.”
The alternative advanced by proponents of highly textualist
formalism—interpretation by dictionary—does not seem either
principled or normatively attractive. Consulting a dictionary to
171
ascertain the document’s meaning does not tell us what the Framers
actually meant; after all, the Constitution lacks a glossary, and it does
not declare a particular contemporaneous dictionary as the next-best
option. Nevertheless, Professors Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna
Prakash argue that “[l]anguage is a social invention, and thus
meaningless without access to those external sources, such as
dictionaries, that explain the rules as to how a particular language is
172
used.” This approach offers only a false hope of avoiding the need
for judges to exercise discretion in interpreting and applying the
Constitution. When a constitutional conflict exists, a dictionary
provides a very poor basis for interpreting and applying the
Constitution when lived experience has important lessons to teach.

167. Id. at 454.
168. Id.
169. Id. Redish and Cisar emphasize that “our version of formalism also rejects use of an
originalist perspective, sometimes thought to be an inherent element of formalism in general.”
Id. at 454 n.23. They expressly reject the use of originalist textualism as a primary means of
enforcing their vision of pragmatic formalism. See id. at 494–97; cf. Calabresi & Prakash, supra
note 55, at 550–58 (advocating a strictly originalist-textualist approach to enforcing separationof-powers doctrine).
170. Redish & Cisar, supra note 149, at 505. For a more complete overview of Redish and
Cisar’s iteration of pragmatic formalism, a topic that lies beyond the scope of this Article, see id.
at 474–90.
171. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 55, at 552 n.35; see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA 144–45 (1990) (advocating the use of “dictionaries in use at the time” of the
framing, as well as other contemporaneous materials, to ascertain the Constitution’s meaning).
172. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 55, at 552 n.35.
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On the other hand, it is remarkable that serious legal academics
would suggest that the President may construe the Senate’s inaction
on a nomination as constituting its de facto consent to it. And yet,
Professor Stephenson suggests that
when the President nominates an individual to a principal office in
the executive branch, where filling that office is essential for the
President to fulfill his or her duty faithfully to execute the laws, the
Senate’s failure to act on the nomination within a reasonable period
of time, despite good faith efforts of the nominee’s supporters to
secure a floor vote, shall be construed as providing the Senate’s tacit
or implied “Advice and Consent” to the appointment within the
173
meaning of the Appointments Clause.

In case there is any doubt about his meaning, he helpfully adds that
“[t]he argument, in other words, is that the appointment of certain
senior executive officers does not require a Senate confirmation vote
174
as a matter of constitutional law.”
Stephenson’s argument represents functionalism running amok.
In light of the unambiguous text of the Appointments Clause, in
tandem with over 225 years of consistent practice—regardless of the
party controlling the White House or the Senate—this kind of “ends
175
justify the means” reasoning simply won’t wash. Constitutional law
and interpretation do not constitute simply another species of
176
politics.
In fairness to Professor Stephenson, he correctly, and reasonably,
invokes the Take Care Clause and the structural imperatives of the
177
unitary executive to justify his otherwise radical proposal. But his
solution—construing a failure to act as the equivalent of the Senate’s

173. Stephenson, supra note 39, at 946.
174. Id.
175. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 431 (observing that “interested parties are
more likely to find ambiguity when their political needs demand it, and in such cases arguments
from historical practice are more likely to feature prominently”).
176. See ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 26, 68, 258–59, 375–76
(1987) (arguing that the legitimacy of constitutional review rests on the “fragile faith” that
constitutional law and politics are separate enterprises); see also Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (arguing that “the main
constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with
respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite
transcending the immediate result that is achieved”). But cf. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1,
at 431–32 (positing that “constitutional law and politics are intertwined” in controversies
involving interbranch disputes implicating the separation of powers).
177. See Stephenson, supra note 39, at 947–49, 953–57.
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affirmative consent to senior executive nominations—is “to burn the
178
house to roast the pig.” Other forms of presidential self-help, such
as designating “czars,” holding presidential staff appointments in the
West Wing, and vesting them with oversight of acting officers within
179
the various departments, would constitute a less radical approach —
and one that does not do violence to the plain meaning of the
180
Constitution’s text.
It also bears noting that Professor Stephenson is hardly alone in
advocating strong forms of presidential self-help in staffing the
executive branch. Professor Roberts argues that the President should
be permitted to determine for himself whether the Senate is available
to receive and consider nominations; if he deems that it is not,
Roberts argues, the President should enjoy a free hand to use the
181
Recess Appointments Clause to fill vacancies. Roberts contends
that
[t]he crux of the President’s argument, therefore, is that while the
Senate could constitutionally preclude any recess appointments by
actually remaining in session throughout the year—in the sense that
a quorum is present and official business is conducted—it may not
block the President’s power by pretending to be in session when it is
not. The argument seems compelling. If pro forma sessions were
valid to block recess appointments during what would otherwise be
a recess, then the President’s power to make recess appointments
even during months-long recesses would be negated, surely
182
disrupting the balance established by the Appointments Clause.

This argument largely corresponds to the arguments advanced by
OLC in support of the President’s position that he could simply
183
disregard the Senate’s pro forma sessions.

178. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (“The State insists that, by thus
quarantining the general reading public against books not too rugged for grown men and
women in order to shield juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general
welfare. Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig.”).
179. See Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White
House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2583–95 (2011) (discussing the use of White Housebased “czars” to superintend policymaking in both cabinet and independent federal agencies).
180. See generally id. at 2603–09 (discussing and analyzing the constitutional status of
domestic policy czars, with particular attention to the separation-of-powers issues that such
appointments present).
181. Roberts, supra note 30, at 749–52.
182. Id. at 749.
183. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
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Professor Peter Shane has offered multiple functionalist
arguments in favor of permitting the President to bypass the Senate’s
advice-and-consent prerogative to staff positions within the executive
184
branch. He suggests that, at a minimum, the federal courts should
decline to intervene if the President engages in self-help by holding
185
that the dispute presents a nonjusticiable political question. Even
Shane and Roberts, however, do not suggest that the President should
be permitted to construe Senate inaction as de facto consent to a
nomination.
These theories all demonstrate quite clearly the significant
shortcomings of functionalism in addressing problems associated with
blended powers. That methodology does not offer any clear
guideposts and leaves federal judges vulnerable to the accusation that
they are simply pursuing their own ideological or, worse yet, political
186
preferences. Functionalism, at least in this context, does not offer an
187
objective basis to justify any particular merits outcome.
Someone more sympathetic to the Senate’s institutional
prerogatives, and particularly to the Senate opposition caucus, could
just as easily argue that because Congress created federal executive
offices, it has the power to abolish them. Failing to confirm
nominations is simply one way of exercising congressional power to
abolish an office on a temporary basis. Accordingly, the argument
would go, the President may not engage in self-help to execute
federal laws, such as relying on White House staff (not subject to
senatorial confirmation) or designating acting officers within the
various cabinet departments. These outcomes are no more
principled—or related to constitutional text, history, and practice—
than the approaches advocated by Professors Stephenson, Roberts,
and Shane. Overlapping powers require courts to take careful account

184. Peter M. Shane, Noel Canning v. NLRB: Should Courts Police the Recess Appointments
Power?, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 195, 202, 207–09 (2013).
185. Id. at 207–09; see also Peter M. Shane, The Future of Recess Appointments in Light of
Noel Canning v. NLRB, BLOOMBERG LAW (May 14, 2013), http://www.bna.com/the-future-ofrecess-appointments-in-light-of-noel-canning-v-nlrb (arguing that the Supreme Court should
sustain the President’s contested recess appointments or deem the dispute a nonjusticiable
political question); Peter M. Shane, NLRB v. New Vista Nursing and Rehabilitation: Third
Circuit Further Fuels the Constitutional Conflict over Recess Appointments, BLOOMBERG BNA
DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (May 24, 2013) (arguing that “unanticipated circumstances”
justify new forms of presidential self-help in filling vacancies).
186. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 149, at 490–91.
187. See id. at 476–77, 491 (arguing that functionalism does not provide “any
comprehensible standard by which to guide particular incursions on the separation of powers”).
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of text, history, and practice to arrive at sensible results. And
reviewing courts should take care not to do more harm than good
through their interventions in these highly contested disputes
between the political branches.
At bottom, functionalism essentially collapses constitutional law
and politics—and in favor of politics. To be sure, there is more than a
little truth to the intuition that judges are hardly apolitical
188
handmaidens of the law. But the federal courts should be wary of
publicly embracing this intuition if they wish to retain the confidence
and support of the American people. If judges become just another
set of politicians in black robes, the theoretical basis for judicial
189
review more or less evaporates.
Cases presenting constitutional conflicts, in light of blended or
shared allocations of power within the Constitution itself, present the
greatest risk of judges appearing to act as political agents rather than
honest brokers. Accordingly, just as a strictly formalist legal analysis
cannot generate useful answers in cases involving constitutional
190
conflicts, neither can a strictly functionalist analysis. In such cases,
courts must deploy the full menu of accepted interpretive techniques.
This toolkit certainly includes text, legislative history, and historical
practice. It also includes broader public-policy concerns, changes in
background facts over time, and the larger purposes that undergird
specific constitutional text. All of these interpretive devices enjoy
broad-based acceptance and legitimacy. Moreover, consistent practice
over time—in the form of constitutional conventions—presents the
most promising and objective interpretive device for resolving
conflicts that are simply part of the Constitution’s original design.

188. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios for Neutral Principles in Constitutional
Law: Bush v. Gore and the Emerging Jurisprudence of Oprah!, 90 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2093–97
(2002) (discussing the political undertones of the Justices’ opinions in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000)).
189. See id. at 2097–2101 (discussing the importance of principled constitutional
decisionmaking to judicial legitimacy, and positing that “if federal judges are simply another set
of partisan actors, it is difficult to see why their decisions should not be popularly accountable”).
190. In such cases, the Constitution mandates diametrically opposed outcomes and does not
provide a textual basis for privileging one clause at the expense of another. See supra notes 24–
47 and accompanying text.
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IV. HISTORICAL PRACTICE AS A MEANS OF REFRAMING
SEPARATION-OF-POWERS ANALYSIS
When the Constitution provides conflicting rules of decision, as
is arguably the case in the context of the Appointments and Take
191
Care Clauses, three questions necessarily follow. First, should
federal courts resolve the conflict or leave it to the political branches
to work out between themselves? Second, and assuming that such
disputes should be viewed as justiciable, what methodology should a
reviewing court use to resolve conflicting constitutional commands?
Third, and finally, what general principles should courts follow in
such circumstances? This Part considers each of these questions and
concludes that such disputes should be deemed justiciable, that the
federal courts should rely on historical practice to inform their
analysis of how to resolve constitutional conflicts, and that the federal
192
courts should choose the “least unconstitutional” path as they
attempt to resolve constitutional conflicts.
A. The Duty To Decide: Why Courts Should Reach the Merits in
Interbranch Disputes Between Congress and the President
Professors Aziz Huq and Peter Shane have separately argued
that the federal courts should not resolve separation-of-powers
193
disputes between the President and Congress. Professor Huq,
writing in the context of presidential removal of executive officers
insulated by for-cause protection, posits that the federal courts should
treat such removals as nonjusticiable political questions because of an
absence of judicially manageable standards for evaluating such
194
claims. He observes that “[r]endering removal nonjusticiable leaves
the underlying constitutional question to be resolved through
195
contestation between democratically credentialed actors.” Huq

191. See Stephenson, supra note 39, at 950–58.
192. Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How To Choose the Least Unconstitutional
Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1175, 1175 (2012).
193. See Huq, supra note 17, at 6–9; Shane, supra note 184, at 207–08; Peter M. Shane, In
NLRB Recess Appointments Case, Roberts Court Can Now Show It Knows How To Exercise
Judicial Restraint, 27 LAB. REL. WK. 1533, Aug. 7, 2013.
194. Huq, supra note 17, at 22–24.
195. Id. at 73.
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argues that abstention on political-question grounds “is not to award
196
the laurel to either Congress or the White House.”
Professor Shane, writing in the context of the President’s
appointments power, advances very similar arguments. He argues
that the Supreme Court should have treated the dispute in Noel
197
Canning as presenting a nonjusticiable political question —one “that
the Court regards as constitutionally left to the elected branches of
198
government to decide for themselves.” He posits that “[w]here the
Constitution assigns to the elected branches a shared power, as with
treaties or appointments, the Court behaves wisely in allowing each
branch’s political and institutional incentives and disincentives to
operate, as they were intended, to curb overreach by the other
199
branch.”
Of course, the Court did not heed this advice—both Justice
Breyer and Justice Scalia offered extensive opinions on all three
200
merits questions presented for decision. But the fact that both the
majority and dissenting blocs reached the merits in Noel Canning
does not answer the harder question of whether they should have
done so. In my view, judicial abstention from interbranch disputes is
201
202
not a passive virtue, but rather an active vice.
Justice Lewis Powell authored one of the most thoughtful, and
influential, glosses on when the Supreme Court should agree to
referee interbranch disputes between the President and Congress. In
203
his iconic concurring opinion in Goldwater v. Carter, he posited that
“[i]nterpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of respect

196. Id.; see id. at 75 (“The net effect of nonjusticiability, in short, is to leave in place
whatever statutory framework Congress and the President have already converged upon, while
effectuating little change to the de facto doctrinal status quo.”).
197. Shane, supra note 184, at 207–09.
198. Id. at 208.
199. Id. at 209.
200. See supra notes 82–137 and accompanying text.
201. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 49–50, 74–79 (arguing that the federal courts sometimes
act wisely in declining to reach the merits of disputes at the first available opportunity).
202. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and
Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 46–48 (1998) (discussing the “active vices of the passive virtues”
and the reasons why judges should consider engaging in a dialectic with Congress about
constitutional values); see also Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (1964)
(describing and discussing the potential pitfalls of undue judicial caution in the enforcement of
constitutional rights).
203. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
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204

for a coordinate branch.” Consistent with this view, Justice Powell
argued that when the President and Congress reach “irreconcilable
positions” on a question regarding the proper scope of each branch’s
respective constitutional authority, the Supreme Court has a duty
205
206
under Marbury v. Madison to “say what the law is.” Undertaking
this responsibility constitutes a core judicial duty that Article III
207
judges cannot legitimately shirk.
Failing to resolve conflicting interbranch claims to constitutional
authority does not so much indicate respect for the coordinate
branches of the federal government as it does abdicate a core
responsibility of the judicial branch. As Justice Powell observed, “If
the President and the Congress had reached irreconcilable positions,
final disposition of the question presented by this case would
eliminate,
rather
than
create,
multiple
constitutional
208
interpretations.” Accordingly, refusing to decide the limits and
scope of the President’s recess-appointments power does not
constitute judicial statesmanship, but rather judicial abdication.
B. Historical Practice as a Potential Tiebreaker for Deciding Difficult
Separation-of-Powers Questions
When constitutional provisions point in different directions, as
209
with the Appointments Clause and the Take Care Clause, recourse
to the Constitution itself will not resolve the ambiguity. In this
respect, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Noel Canning lacks persuasive
force because he focuses myopically on the Appointments Clause and
gives no attention whatsoever to the Take Care Clause (or, for that
210
matter, to the Opinions Clause). To focus exclusively on the

204. Id. at 1001.
205. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
206. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1000 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
at 177).
207. Id. at 1001; see Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427–28 (2012) (“In general, the
Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly before it, even those it ‘would gladly
avoid.’” (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821))).
208. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1001.
209. See Stephenson, supra note 39, at 953–55.
210. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2617–18 (2014) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (dismissing the majority’s analysis as little more than an endorsement of the socalled “adverse-possession” theory of the recess-appointments power, and arguing that it “will
have the effect of aggrandizing the Presidency beyond its constitutional bounds”). But see
Adrian Vermeule, Recess Appointments and Precautionary Constitutionalism, 126 HARV. L.
REV. F. 122, 123 (2013) (warning against a “myopic” focus, “even to the point of obsession, on a
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Senate’s role in giving its advice and consent, to the complete
exclusion of the textual mandate for the President to enforce federal
211
law, is to miss the forest for the tree.
On the other hand, focusing exclusively on the Take Care
212
Clause, to the detriment of the Appointments Clause, would be no
less objectionable. Formalism must take seriously all of the textual
and structural commitments relevant to a particular separation-ofpowers problem. In this context, such an approach would require a
reviewing court to reconcile the Framers’ clearly stated intention that
the Senate consent to the President’s appointments to principal
executive-branch offices with the equally clearly stated intention that
the President be able to oversee effectively the operation of the
executive branch (reflected in both the Take Care and Opinions
213
Clauses ). Simply put, the text, unaided, will not provide clear
answers.
Professor Curtis Bradley and Dean Trevor Morrison have
advanced a thoughtful and carefully calibrated gloss on how historical
practice should inform contemporary separation-of-powers
214
disputes.
As they accurately observe, “Arguments based on
historical practice are a mainstay of debates about the constitutional
215
separation of powers.” This is so precisely because, in many key

particular target risk, while ignoring countervailing risks, including risks generated by the
precautions themselves”). Vermeule suggests that “[a]n enlightened decisionmaker will do well
to consider the systemic, dynamic, and long-run effects of any given precaution, including the
long-run risk of backlash resulting in perverse outcomes.” Id. at 124.
211. It is ironic that Justice Scalia, in another context, has called out President Obama for, in
his view, failing to enforce federal law with sufficient vigor in the context of federal immigration
law and policy. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521–22 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212. See Roberts, supra note 30, at 733–39; Shane, supra note 184, at 202.
213. See AMAR, supra note 127, at 326 (arguing that the “animating spirit of the opinions
clause” is “to concentrate accountability for presidential action on the president himself”);
Sidak, supra note 131, at 1164 (arguing that “the fundamental principle animating the
Constitution—the separation of powers—dictates a unitary Executive, and that a unitary
Executive cannot tolerate congressional encroachments that, under the pretext of guarding the
public purse, deny the President the funds necessary to perform the duties and exercise the
prerogatives conferred on him by article II”); id. at 1185–89 (arguing that Congress may not
constitutionally prevent the President from discharging mandatory duties by refusing to
appropriate the funds necessary for their execution). Amar argues that “[n]o matter how
Congress might choose to contour various executive departments and offices beneath the
president, the president needed to serve as the legal hub of the executive inner circle and the
apex of the executive pyramid.” AMAR, supra note 127, at 326.
214. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 414–17.
215. Id. at 412.
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contexts, the Framers pursued a balance of powers rather than a
true separation of powers.
Among the factors that Bradley and Morrison identify as
relevant to using historical gloss to inform separation-of-powers
doctrine and practice are the reasons historical practice is relevant,
and the nature, if any, of acquiescence by one branch in another
branch’s practices (including “whether they reflect interbranch
217
agreements or mere waivers”). They also suggest that reviewing
courts should maintain some degree of skepticism about executivebranch claims of legislative acquiescence (in light of collective-action
problems that plague Congress). Finally, Bradley and Morrison posit
that the “institutional context in which the question arises” must be
218
taken into account.
Accordingly, “The more an interpreter deems nonpractice
evidence like the text and original understanding to be clear, the less
likely the interpreter is to credit historical practice that points in a
different direction—or, put differently, the more widespread and
deeply entrenched the practice must be in order to change the
219
outcome.” Conversely, if nonpractice material is “ambiguous or
indeterminate, the more likely the interpreter is to rely on historical
220
practice to inform constitutional meaning.”
Along similar lines, Professor Adrian Vermeule has suggested
that quasi-constitutional rules arise through “conventions”—
216. The British Constitution, too, features a “balance of powers” rather than a full
separation of powers. See James Hyre, Comment, The United Kingdom’s Declaration of Judicial
Independence: Creating a Supreme Court To Secure Individual Rights Under the Human Rights
Act of 1998, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 432–33 (2004); see also ROBERT STEVENS, THE
ENGLISH JUDGES: THEIR ROLE IN THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 9 (2002) (observing that
“balance of powers rather than separation of powers was the British choice”). Although the
U.S. Constitution plainly embraces the concept of separating and dividing government powers
in order to better secure individual liberty, in some important contexts—for example, the war
powers—the Framers instead elected to blend, rather than clearly divide, constitutional
responsibilities. See supra note 14. In these contexts, where the Constitution calls for a balance
rather than a separation of powers, courts simply cannot avoid engaging in careful analysis and
balancing to resolve interbranch disputes. Neither formalism nor functionalism, unaided, will
prove adequate to the task at hand.
217. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 414.
218. Id. at 415; see Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of
Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 134 (1984) (arguing that three conditions must be met in
order for a consistent practice to become a binding constitutional convention—namely, that the
custom “must consist of acts,” the branch affected must have been aware of the practice, and
“the branch placed on notice must have acquiesced in the custom”).
219. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 430.
220. Id. at 430–31.
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221

consistent practices over time. Vermeule argues that “[b]etween
‘politics’ on the one hand and formal written law on the other lies a
222
third category of unwritten rules of the game, or conventions.” He
suggests that, at least in theorizing agency independence, “the lens of
convention is useful . . . in the American administrative state,
allowing us to make sense of phenomena that from a formal legal
223
point of view must remain mysterious.” When formal law provides
conflicting rules of decision, reliance on conventions, established and
applied over time, presents the best available means of providing an
objective basis for a reviewing court’s decision, thereby insulating it
from the potential objection that it reflects simply a judicial, rather
224
than constitutional, ordering of values.
Other scholars of the administrative process have observed that
administrative agencies are themselves responsible for creating
225
constitutional rules through their practices.
Professor Gillian
Metzger, for example, posits that “[i]n practice, administrative
constitutionalism also encompasses the elaboration of new
constitutional understandings by administrative actors, as well as the
construction (or ‘constitution’) of the administrative state through
226
structural and substantive measures.” She situates her work as part
of a larger body of legal scholarship that seeks to explain the
“constitutional role played by ordinary law and the central
importance to our constitutional system of political efforts to
227
construct constitutional meaning.”
Metzger’s argument corresponds in important ways with
Vermeule’s work on conventions—both scholars argue that practices,
221. See Vermeule, supra note 21, at 1166–68, 1181–86. Vermeule defines conventions as
“unwritten rules,” id. at 1231, and suggests that conventions are binding even if they are not
formally judicially enforceable, see id. at 1181–83.
222. Id. at 1231.
223. Id.
224. Cf. BICKEL, supra note 22, at 69–72, 204–96 (discussing the countermajoritarian
problem of courts invalidating the actions of the politically accountable branches of the federal
government, and suggesting that the legitimacy of judicial decisions must rest on both the
appearance and reality of being grounded in constitutional, rather than individual, morality). As
Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., explained, “it is one thing for a judge to adopt a theory of political
morality because it is his own; it is another for him to exercise his judgment about what the
political morality implied by the Constitution is.” Frank M. Johnson, Jr., In Defense of Judicial
Activism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901, 909 (1979).
225. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV.
1897 (2013).
226. Id. at 1900.
227. Id. at 1902.
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over time, come to enjoy a kind of quasi-constitutional (if not full
228
Thus, Metzger argues that “[s]imilar
constitutional) status.
exploitation of the ordinary law–constitutional law overlap could
occur in other contexts, for example by courts according entrenched
229
statutory norms more of a constitutional status.”
These arguments, advanced by distinguished administrative-law
scholars, demonstrate that consistent practice, over time, can come to
play a role in constraining government—a constraint that, if not
identical to formal constitutional rules, resembles them in terms of its
effective binding force. I do not suggest that practice—or
conventions—should be permitted to override the express
requirements of the Constitution. For example, it is nonsensical to
suggest that the President may appoint principal executive officers
without seeking and obtaining the overt consent of the Senate to each
230
and every appointment. But in trying to assess how best to reconcile
the Recess Appointments Clause with the reality that the
contemporary Senate seems incapable of acting expeditiously on most
presidential nominations (especially in periods of divided
government), recourse to the historical dynamics between the Senate
231
and the President has much to recommend it.
C. On the Virtues of Taking the Least Unconstitutional Path
The Senate’s inability (or unwillingness) to act on many senior
presidential appointments presents nontrivial constitutional
232
problems. The President cannot ensure that the laws are faithfully

228. See id. at 1903–15.
229. Id. at 1902.
230. But cf. Stephenson, supra note 39, at 978 (“This Essay has argued that under some
circumstances, the President should be able to appoint senior executive branch officers without
a Senate confirmation vote.”). Stephenson explains that “[t]he pragmatic justification for this
proposal derives from the concern that Senate obstruction of executive branch appointments
seems to be getting out of hand.” Id.
231. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 117 (2005) (discussing the duty of judges to interpret and apply constitutional
values in ways that ensure the relevancy of moral and political commitments enshrined in the
document itself, and emphasizing that “[t]he relevant values limit interpretive possibilities”).
232. See Roberts, supra note 30, at 727 (arguing that the “long-term struggle between the
President and the Senate over executive appointments has now reached a crisis and that we may
be approaching a point where the President’s crucial duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed is significantly impaired”); see also Vermeule, supra note 210, at 124 (warning that the
existence of partisan gridlock on appointments could “produce so much pent-up demand for
reform of the appointments process that the President offers some radical reinterpretation of
the Constitution, one that gives him substantially increased discretion over appointments”).
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executed if he cannot staff offices within the executive branch. Nor
233
may the President seek and obtain “Opinions in Writing” from
absent officers. Nevertheless, the very structure of the executive
branch presupposes that the President will enjoy the assistance of
234
subordinates loyal to him and his administration.
The work of several prominent administrative-law scholars
provides helpful insights on how best to navigate the structural
conflict between the Senate and President over appointments. This
Part explores how the scholarship of Professors O’Connell, Manning,
Buchanan, and Dorf could inform answers to these difficult questions.
Professor Anne Joseph O’Connell persuasively argues that
“agency vacancies have consequences for the unitary theory of the
235
executive and for separation of powers doctrine more generally.” If
the President cannot staff key positions within the administration, the
unitary executive becomes less unitary; an acting or career officer
holding a position in a caretaker capacity lacks both political
236
legitimacy and political accountability. So too, judicial-deference
237
doctrines, like Chevron,
rest on the premise that politically
accountable agency administrators enjoy greater legitimacy if the
question presented for decision is really one of policy rather than law;
whether the same presumption of legitimacy should be afforded to
the handiwork of an acting official caretaker presents a difficult
238
question.
Thus, the failure to staff executive-branch offices produces
constitutional harms—just as would presidential self-help of the sort
posited by Professor Stephenson. But whether one leaves the
President minding the store without sufficient subordinates to ensure
faithful execution of the law or permits the President, by some
subterfuge, to evade the requirement of obtaining the Senate’s
consent to the appointment of all principal officers, a constitutional
harm will occur. A constitutional injury, in these circumstances,
simply cannot be avoided.

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
(1984).
238.

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
See O’Connell, supra note 126, at 974–85.
Id. at 974.
See id. at 974–80.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66
See O’Connell, supra note 126, at 981–84.
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One could attempt to resolve the conflict by giving the more
specific constitutional command precedence over the more general
command; Professor Manning advocates this approach to deciding
239
He rejects the notion of a
separation-of-powers conflicts.
freestanding separation-of-powers doctrine based on general
240
structural features of the Constitution, such as the Vesting Clauses.
Still, he cautions that “[t]o say that there is no freestanding separation
of powers doctrine is not to say that the Constitution contains no
241
judicially enforceable separation of powers.”
Professor Manning argues that “when the Constitution is
242
specific, the Court should read it the way it reads all specific texts,”
by which Manning means that a specific constitutional allocation of a
power or duty cannot simply be reassigned for reasons of convenience
243
or efficiency. On the other hand, “where no specific clause speaks
directly to the question at issue, interpreters must respect the
244
document’s indeterminacy.” Manning posits that separation-ofpowers inquiries should be refocused on “the specific ways in which
constitutionmakers did, and did not, resolve structural issues in the
245
bargained-for constitutional text.”
Professor Manning’s general theory—of strictly enforcing
specific constitutional limits and recognizing substantial congressional
discretion to adopt novel agency structures in cases where any
separation-of-powers objection rests largely (if not entirely) on the
246
Vesting Clauses —will work well in circumstances in which a general
or a specific clause is at issue. It will also work when only a single
specific clause is at issue—or when a single specific clause is in tension
with one or more general clauses. However, Manning does not
address how best to resolve conflicts that implicate not a general and
a specific clause, but two or more specific clauses. In such a
239. See Manning, supra note 5, at 1947–49.
240. See id. at 1945–48, 1985–86, 1991–93, 2017–21.
241. Id. at 1947.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 1947–48.
244. Id. at 1948.
245. Id. at 1948–49.
246. But see Lawson, supra note 5, at 857–58 (arguing that the federal courts should enforce
the structural implications of the Vesting Clauses to block reassignment of functions or duties
among the three branches because “[a]ny exercise of governmental power, and any
governmental institution exercising that power, must either fit within one of the three formal
categories thus established [by the Vesting Clauses] or find explicit constitutional authorization
for such a deviation”).
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circumstance, one can infer that the general judicial duty to give full
effect to specific power-allocating clauses would apply, but a conflict
between such clauses cannot be self-resolving. The questions then
become whether the courts should resolve such conflicts (or simply
defer to the President and Congress) and, assuming that they should,
how best to resolve constitutional conflicts of this sort.
Courts clearly have a duty to resolve cases that present otherwise
247
irreconcilable conflicts between the political branches. Accordingly,
courts must determine how best to reconcile conflicting constitutional
commands when, on the facts presented, it is impossible to give full
effect to both.
Professors Neil Buchanan and Michael Dorf, in the context of
the debt-ceiling controversy, have argued cogently that the President
has a duty to take the “least unconstitutional” road when he cannot
248
fully discharge all of his constitutional responsibilities. By this, they
mean that when a conflict arises between statutes, it may not be
possible for the President to implement both fully and effectively—
notwithstanding a general constitutional duty to “take [c]are” that all
249
federal laws be given effect. As Buchanan and Dorf state the
paradox, “the president risks acting unconstitutionally no matter what
he might do, because he will have failed to execute at least one duly
250
enacted law of the United States.” They also note that, at present,
“[t]here is virtually no legal doctrine governing the choice among
251
unconstitutional options.”
In the specific context of the debt-ceiling limit and the
countervailing duty to pay principal and interest on existing U.S. debt
instruments, or in cases of a conflict between an annual appropriation
and the debt ceiling, Buchanan and Dorf argue that ignoring the debt
252
ceiling would present the “least unconstitutional” option.
In
reaching this conclusion, they offer three general principles that
should govern the analysis. First, the President should choose the
253
option that minimizes his usurpation of power. Second, he also
247. See supra notes 205–08 and accompanying text.
248. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 192, at 1181–82, 1218–19, 1243.
249. Id. at 1196–97 & n.93.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1221.
252. See id. at 1243.
253. Id. at 1222–29. Buchanan and Dorf emphasize that, in undertaking this analysis, “any
measure of comparative constitutional harm should be qualitative, not quantitative—or at least
not merely quantitative.” Id. at 1224.
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254

should minimize subconstitutional harm. Finally, the President
should choose the option that is easiest to remedy with respect to the
255
constitutional violation (or violations) that result.
Noel Canning presented facts involving a certain constitutional
harm—either failing to honor the clear procedural requirements of
the Appointments Clause or leaving the President incapable of
enforcing federal laws because of his inability to staff an independent
agency featuring a collective head. President Obama chose an
unconstitutional option, by unilaterally deciding for himself that the
Senate’s pro forma sessions did not count for purposes of applying
the Recess Appointments Clause. In consequence, the Supreme
Court disallowed this exercise in presidential self-help and voided the
256
President’s contested NLRB appointments.
Tellingly, however, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion does not
resolve the larger constitutional impasse between the President and
the Senate. To be sure, the Senate may decide for itself whether or
257
not it is in session (within very broad parameters). But even if the
Senate may refuse to confirm pending nominations and may also
block the President from making recess appointments by holding pro
258
forma sessions at least every ten days, President Obama’s actions
hardly exhaust the universe of potential presidential responses to
259
Senate intransigence on his nominations.
Simply put, the full potential scope of presidential self-help in
staffing and operating the executive branch was not presented in Noel
Canning. Accordingly, the exact parameters of permissible
presidential self-help in operating an executive branch plagued by
vacancies remain to be determined. The President could conceivably
254. Id. at 1229–39.
255. Id. at 1239–43. They also note that “[t]o the extent that a choice among putatively
unconstitutional options is controversial because of a contest over constitutional meaning,
political actors ought to strive to ensure that their favored option permits expeditious judicial
review.” Id. at 1240.
256. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2567, 2574–75 (2014).
257. Id. at 2574–77.
258. Id. at 2567, 2574–77.
259. The possibility of frustrating a coordinate branch runs in both directions, of course. If
the President opposed a law but could not successfully seek its repeal, he could frustrate the
law’s execution by simply failing to nominate the principal and inferior officers needed to
execute the authority that Congress delegated to the agency in question. In this way, the
Constitution’s provisions on nominations reflect not only a check by the Senate on the
President, but also a check by the President against Congress. Just as the President may not
decide when the Senate is in session, the Senate may not entertain nominations not offered by
the President.
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take steps short of ignoring the Senate’s availability to receive and
consider nominations that would facilitate faithful execution of the
laws (and thereby ensure presidential accountability for the
enforcement of federal law). Moreover, such intermediate steps
would be more likely to constitute the least unconstitutional option—
and therefore should be preferred over bolder unilateral presidential
260
action.
Read against the work of Professors Vermeule, O’Connell,
Buchanan, and Dorf, the Noel Canning majority opinion constitutes a
masterful solution to a difficult constitutional conflict—and it
manages not to upset the careful balance of powers that the Framers
struck in assigning responsibility for appointments between the
President and the Senate. In so doing, it takes into account the
practical necessity of the President having sufficient assistance to
execute his constitutional responsibilities. As Justice Breyer observes,
the Recess Appointments Clause exists “to permit the President to
obtain the assistance of subordinate officers when the Senate, due to
261
its recess, cannot confirm them.” The Constitution mandates
presidential “control and political accountability” over the executive
262
branch. At the same time, however, “the Recess Appointments
263
Clause is not designed to overcome serious institutional friction,”
but rather “simply provides a subsidiary method for appointing
264
officials when the Senate is away during a recess.”
Moreover, although the Noel Canning majority squarely rejected
President Obama’s attempt to install principal and inferior officers
without satisfying the procedural requirements of the Appointments
Clause, it left the recess-appointments power on the table as a means
of overcoming entrenched senatorial opposition to the President’s
nominations—if, but only if, the Senate elects to close up shop for a
nontrivial period of time. The rules set forth by the Supreme Court
should also be largely self-enforcing and will not require active and
ongoing judicial superintendence of the appointments process.
Faced with a direct constitutional conflict, Justice Breyer
fashioned the “least unconstitutional” result by integrating the
imperative of presidential control and oversight over the executive

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 192, at 1181–82, 1218–19, 1239–43.
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2568.
Id. at 2569.
Id. at 2577.
Id.
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branch with the concurrent constitutional command that the Senate
265
play a meaningful role in overseeing presidential appointments. He
did so because “friction between the branches is an inevitable
266
consequence of our constitutional structure.”
Justice Breyer’s approach is entirely consistent with the text of
the Recess Appointments Clause and comports with the larger
purposes that animated its inclusion in the Constitution. Writing in
Federalist No. 67, Alexander Hamilton explains:
The ordinary power of appointment is confined to the President and
Senate jointly, and can therefore only be exercised during the
session of the Senate; but as it would have been improper to oblige
this body to be continually in session for the appointment of officers
and as vacancies might happen in their recess, which it might be
necessary for the public service to fill without delay, the [Recess
Appointments Clause] is evidently intended to authorize the
President, singly, to make temporary appointments “during the
recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at
267
the end of their next session.”

It is clear from this passage that the Framers undertook both to
establish a norm of senatorial approval of presidential appointments
and to provide an alternative means of appointment that would
permit the government to function effectively when the Senate, for
whatever reason, was not available to consider presidential
nominations. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion fully honors these
intentions.
So where does this leave a President who lacks the personnel
required to discharge his constitutional duties? Professor O’Connell
notes that presidents have invoked the Take Care Clause as a
predicate for making emergency appointments free and clear of both
268
the Appointments Clause and the Recess Appointments Clause.
Professor O’Connell explains that “[e]arly Attorneys General
consistently argued that the president retained power to make
temporary appointments outside of the Appointments Clause” and
that “[t]his power derived, in their view, from the Take Care

265. It is clear that the Framers viewed the question in these terms. See THE FEDERALIST
NO. 67, supra note 16, at 409–10 (Alexander Hamilton).
266. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577.
267. THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, supra note 16, at 409–10 (Alexander Hamilton).
268. See O’Connell, supra note 126, at 975–77.
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269

Clause.” Although the Supreme Court has never reached the
question of the scope of the President’s power to staff positions
within the executive branch incident to the Take Care Clause, the
Court must read the Recess Appointments Clause in tandem with this
270
overarching, textually specific, presidential obligation.
Nevertheless, in the Noel Canning dispute over the contested
NLRB appointments, the President failed to choose the least
unconstitutional option in purporting to recess-appoint members to
the NLRB when the Senate’s recesses were shorter than ten days
(meaning that the Senate was effectively available to receive and
consider nominations). Rather than determine for himself what
constitutes a session of the Senate, President Obama should instead
have considered using less controversial forms of self-help that did
not usurp the Senate’s authority under Article I, Section 5, Clause 2.
For example, the President could have appointed “czars” holding
staff appointments in the West Wing, perhaps in conjunction with
reliance on acting officials who could discharge at least some of the
statutory duties vested in a particular board, bureau, commission, or
271
department of the executive branch. To be sure, these alternatives
would not work effectively in all cases, but they would surely work in
at least some cases.
Moreover, the Supreme Court would likely sustain such
presidential self-help practices as constitutional because Article II’s
specific language creates mandatory duties that the President must
discharge. Just as the President may not seek to superintend the
272
Senate or exercise a power delegated to Congress, Congress may
273
not seek to usurp the President’s constitutional prerogatives. In
sum, a pragmatic formalist approach must take account of both the
Senate’s role in the appointments process and also the President’s
274
duty to enforce the laws that Congress has enacted.
269. Id. at 975.
270. See Amar, supra note 34, at 788–95.
271. For a thoughtful and thorough discussion of the Obama administration’s use of czars to
direct policy within the executive branch, see Saiger, supra note 179, at 2577–83.
272. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (holding that
“the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to
be a lawmaker”).
273. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722–25 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
121–22 (1976).
274. See Redish & Cisar, supra note 149, at 453–55, 474–78 (describing pragmatic formalism
and discussing its merits, which include careful attention to text, context, and historical practice
to address the ambiguities that inhere in the Constitution’s text).
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Professor Amar argues that constitutional clauses must be read
dynamically and conjunctively—synergistically—rather than in
splendid isolation. He posits that sound constitutional interpretation
must “always focus[ ] on at least two clauses and highlight[ ] the link
275
between them.”
Amar claims that “[c]lause-bound textualism
paradigmatically stresses what is explicit in the Constitution’s text,”
whereas “intratextualism paradigmatically stresses what is only
276
implicit in the Constitution’s text.” In thinking about the federal
appointments process, the federal courts have to reconcile conflicting
constitutional imperatives—the Senate’s voice in the appointments
process and the President’s concomitant duty to oversee the
enforcement of federal laws, such that the President is meaningfully
responsible and politically accountable for his discharge of these
277
duties.
The Framers designed a presidency whose chief officer was to
278
oversee a “vigorous Executive.” Writing in Federalist No. 70,
Alexander Hamilton argues that an energetic chief executive is
essential to effective governance and that “energy in the executive”
comprises “unity; duration; an adequate provision for its support; and
279
competent powers.” The President has a serious constitutional basis
for demanding that Congress provide the subordinate officers
280
necessary for him to perform his constitutional duties. But the
strength of this claim is not sufficient to justify any and all forms of
presidential self-help. Instead, as Buchanan and Dorf have suggested

275. Amar, supra note 34, at 788.
276. Id. To be clear, I do not endorse or embrace the strong form of intratextualism that
Professor Amar advocates. This interpretative methodology should not be used in isolation, but
rather in conjunction with careful attention to precedent, practice, and history. See DANIEL A.
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 77–83 (2002). As Farber and Sherry state their main
objections, “To the extent that intratextualism is designed to mandate some conclusions and
preclude others, then, it is too weakly specified and too easily manipulable.” Id. at 82. Thus,
unlike how Amar presents it—and consistent with Farber and Sherry’s main objection—
intratexual interpretation should be an interpretive tool used only after an ambiguity in need of
clarification has been identified in a specific clause or provision of the Constitution, rather than
to introduce an ambiguity where it otherwise does not seem to exist.
277. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497–98
(2010).
278. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 16, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton).
279. Id. at 424.
280. See Sidak, supra note 131, at 1185–94, 1235–39. Sidak argues that “[a]ny article II duty
is a mandatory task of the Presidency,” id. at 1185, and that Congress may not impede the
ability of the President to perform such mandatory tasks. See id. at 1185–88.

KROTOSZYNSKI IN PRINTER FINAL (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE)

1568

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

5/7/2015 6:37 PM

[Vol. 64:1513

281

in a different context, the federal courts should require the
President to choose the “least unconstitutional” form of self-help in
the face of congressional intransigence on appointments. Usurping
the power to decide when the Senate is in session, however, is
282
emphatically not the least unconstitutional choice.
CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, even if one is generally sympathetic to
formalist analysis of separation-of-powers questions, formalism’s first
principles will not always yield clear or consistent results. This is so
because the Framers not only separated, but also blended, both
structures and substantive powers. In light of this reality, a
commitment to a principled—and pragmatic—brand of formalism
requires careful consideration of historical practice in cases in which
an exclusively text-based approach will not resolve one of the many
ambiguities that the Framers deliberately built into the Constitution.
The federal appointments process provides an excellent illustrative
example of this problem.
The Constitution contains conflicting objectives—notably
including the Senate’s prerogative to play a meaningful role in filling
federal executive and judicial vacancies alongside a concurrent,
freestanding commitment to a unitary executive headed by a
President who enjoys both the power and a duty to enforce all federal
laws. Accordingly, both simplistic formalist textualism and
unprincipled “ends justify the means” functionalist proposals to
permit the President to bypass the Senate should be squarely rejected
in favor of an analytical approach that uses historical practice to
inform how best to resolve the conflict embedded in the
Constitution’s text.
The Noel Canning majority embraces pragmatic formalism: it
carefully relies on text, history, practice, and policy to ground its
resolution of the important separation-of-powers questions presented
for decision. Moreover, Noel Canning leaves the political branches
largely free to continue their historical dialectic—the decision
provides rules of the road going forward, but it does not vest either
branch with an absolute trump card. In this respect, the majority

281. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 192, at 1181–82, 1219–20, 1239–40, 1243.
282. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2567, 2574–75, 2577–78
(2014).
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opinion respects the Framers’ considered decision to balance, rather
than separate, power in the context of appointments by leaving the
Constitution’s deliberate ambiguity in place. A pragmatic formalist
should welcome decisions of this sort, which honor the Framers’
intentions far more effectively than blindly enforcing one
constitutional rule at the direct expense of another.

